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THE GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL VERDICT:
POLITICAL EXPEDIENCY AT THE EXPENSE OF
MORAL PRINCIPLE
MARX A. WOODMANSEE*
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 30, 1981,John W. Hinckley, Jr. fired several gun-
shots at the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan. One
of those bullets entered the President's chest, wounding him
almost fatally.1 Other bullets from Hinckley's weapon struck
members of the President's staff and security detail.2 For his
attempt on the President's life, Hinckley was prosecuted under
18 U.S.C. § 1751. a Hinckley asserted a diminished capacity
defense4 and a jury found him not guilty by reason of insanity.'
Although the assassination attempt itself shocked the nation,
Hinckley's June 21, 1982 acquittal produced further upheaval
throughout society and the legal community.6 Through his
actions and his subsequent insanity acquittal, John Hinckley
* BA., 1993, University of Notre Dame; J.D. Candidate, 1996, Notre
Dame Law School; Thomas J. White Scholar, 1994-96. I am grateful to
Professor John H. Robinson for his helpful comments and suggestions. I
dedicate this article to the memory of my late mother, Annette L. Woodmansee.
She taught me to live "with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the
right." May her soul, through the mercy of God, rest in peace.
1. See Howell Raines, Reagan Wounded in Chest by Gunman, N.Y. TIMES,
March 31, 1981, at Al; David Broder, Reagan Wounded by Assailant's Bullet, WASH.
POST, March 31, 1981, at Al.
2. See Douglas Feaver, Three Men Shot at the Side of Their President, WASH.
POST, March 31, 1981, at A7. Reagan's press secretary, James S. Brady, Secret
Service agent Timothy J. McArthy, and District of Columbia police officer
Thomas K. Delehanty were wounded in Hinckley's attack. Brady was shot in the
head and suffered serious injuries as a result of the wound.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1751(c) criminalizes attempts to assassinate the President
of the United States of America. Hinckley was also indicted for assault on a
United States Secret Service agent (18 U.S.C. § 111), use of a firearm in the
commission of a federal offense (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)), and other charges
stemming from violations of the laws of the District of Columbia. See United
States v. Hincldey, 525 F. Supp. 1342, 1345 (D.D.C. 1981).
4. See United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1981).
5. See Stuart Taylor, Hinckley is Cleared but is Held Insane in Reagan Attack,
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1982, at Al.
6. See, e.g., Robert Tomasson, U.S. Attorney Seeks End of Insanity Defense Plea,
N.Y. TIMs, Aug. 7, 1982, at 31; Irving Kaufman, The Insanity Plea on Trial N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 8, 1982, at 16.
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unwittingly fueled an ongoing debate that focused on mental ill-
ness and its implications for criminal defendants.
The controversy that surrounded the Hinckley case intensi-
fied a debate about the insanity defense that had begun prior to
March of 1981. Although the traditional notion of the insanity
defense experienced substantial change as a result of the Ameri-
can Law Institute's 1962 Model Penal Code,7 the outcome of San
Francisco's 1979 Dan White trial renewed calls for reform.' On
November 27, 1978, Dan White, a former San Francisco City
Supervisor, shot and killed both San Francisco Mayor George
Moscone and fellow Supervisor Harvey Milk. White, apparently
angered over Moscone's refusal to reappoint him as supervisor,9
confronted the mayor in his office prior to a press conference at
which Moscone had planned to announce the new supervisor.
White shot Moscone four times. He then reloaded his pistol, ran
to Milk's office, and shot him five times. 10 White was charged
with two counts of first degree murder and the prosecutor
alleged special circumstances for purposes of later seeking the
7. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
According to the Model Penal Code:
A person is responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.
Id. Addressing the significance of the Model Penal Code's position, Professor
Norman Finkel notes that the Code "expresses a strong preference for impos-
ing criminal liability only if there is proof of awareness that one is committing
the conduct or causing the result required for the crime at issue." According to
Finkel, the Code "permits evidence of mental abnormality to be introduced not
only on the insanity issue, but also on the issue of whether the accused had the
mens rea associated with the alleged crime." See NormanJ. Finkel & Christopher
Slobogin, Insanity, Justification, and Culpability: Toward a Unifidng Schema, 19 LAw
& HuM. BEHAv. 447, 448 (1995). For a description of the insanity defense and
its evolution, see, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRrMINAL LAw 299-304
(1987); NoRMAN J. FINKEL, THERAPY AND ETHICS: THE COURTSHIP OF LAW AND
PSYCHOLOGY 116-34 (1980); GA. Smith &JA. Hall, Evaluating Michigan's Guilty
But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Empirical Study, 16 U. MICH.J. L. RF. 77, n.3 (1982).
8. See generally KENNETH W. SALTER, THE TRIAL OF DAN WHITE (1991).
9. White had previously resigned from his post as City Supervisor on
November 10. Several days later, White reconsidered his decision and sought
to withdraw his resignation. White's colleague Harvey Milk, however,
apparently convinced Mayor Moscone not to reappoint White. On November
26, 1978, ajournalist informed White that the mayor in fact had decided not to
reappoint him and would name White's successor at a press conference on the
following day - November 27, 1978. See SALTER supra, note 8, at /; GEORGE P.
FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME 12-13 (1995).
10. SALTER, supra note 8, at .
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death penalty.11 Asserting a defense of diminished capacity,1"
defense lawyers argued that White's severe depression precluded
a conviction for first degree murder and urged jurors to convict
White only of voluntary manslaughter. 3 On May 21, 1979, the
jurors rejected the prosecutor's request for a murder conviction;
they found White guilty of voluntary manslaughter. 4 The ver-
dict precipitated a night of violent riots in the streets of San Fran-
cisco" and provided reformers with fertile ground upon which
to call for new laws governing diminished capacity defenses.
11. Id. at 9. In his opening statement, the prosecutor asserted that the
evidence would "support the charges of murder in the first degree and the
special circumstances which have been alleged here." See also Duffy Jennings,
Dan White Juty Hears the Final Arguments, S. F. CHRON., May 16, 1979, at 1.
12. See BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 458 (6th. ed. 1990). BLACK's describes a
diminished capacity doctrine which "recognizes that although an accused was
not suffering from a mental disease or defect when the offense was committed
sufficient to exonerate him from all criminal responsibility, his mental capacity
may have been diminished by intoxication, trauma, or mental disease so that he
did not possess the specific mental state or intent essential to the particular
offense charged." Id. See also, FLETCHER, supra note 9, at 179 (A diminished
capacity defense "makes no claim about the rectitude of the action; the claim is
merely that in view of his mental condition the culprit [in cases in which he has
been charged with murder] should be found guilty of the lesser offense of
manslaughter."); Peter Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished
Responsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 827
(1977).
13. Jennings, supra note 11. In proffering its diminished capacity
argument, the defense focused on whether or not White's mental condition at
the time of the crime left him blame-worthy for the two murders. During the
course of its case, the defense presented evidence to establish that White
suffered from depression. The defense argued that White's diet during the
days leading up to the crime - a high-sugar diet which included large
quantities of junk food - caused White to act violently. Dr. Martin Blinder,
testifying for the defense, claimed that such diets could "precipitate anti-social
and even violent behavior." See FLETCHER, supra note 9, at 30-32. During the
course of his testimony, Dr. Blinder concluded that "if it were not for all the
tremendous pressures on him the weeks prior to the shooting, and perhaps if it
were not for the ingestion of this aggravating factor, this junk food ... I would
suspect that these homicides would not have taken place." SALTER, supra note 8,
at 191. Blinder's argument that "White killed because he had been eating too
much junk food" quickly became known facetiously as the "Twinkie Defense."
FLETCHER, supra note 9, at 31-32.
14. The Shocked Jurors Defend Their Verdic, S. F. CHRON., May 23, 1979, at 1.
See also FLETCHER, supra note 9, at 14-15.
15. Katy Butler, Anatomy Of Gay Riot, S. F. CHRON., May 23, 1979, at 1. See
also FLETCHER, supra note 9, at 15. Fletcher summarizes the public outrage that
followed White's conviction for manslaughter:
The mitigation of Dan White's condemnation set off delayed shock
waves. San Francisco had reacted to the killings of November 27 with
a show of peaceful solidarity.... Yet on May 21, 1979, the night of the
verdict, the disappointment doubled. Feeling betrayed by a system
1996]
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John Hinckley's acquittal in 1982 once again focused national
attention on the diminished capacity defense and thus reignited
the reform movement.
The ensuing debate provided the impetus for a variety of
legislative reforms (both at the state and the national level) that
attempted to address the public's concern about the penal sys-
tem's approach to mentally ill defendants. 6 Although many dif-
ferent alternative reforms were discussed and ultimately passed
in a number ofjurisdictions,"7 this article will focus primarily on
the "guilty but mentally ill verdict" (GBMI). Thirteen states
enacted a form of the guilty but mentally ill verdict during the
period that followed the trials of Dan White andJohn Hinckley."
In order to find a criminal defendant "guilty but mentally ill," a
jury must determine that (1) the defendant is guilty of the
offense charged; and (2) the defendant was mentally ill at the
time he committed the offense.19 A "guilty but mentally ill" ver-
dict holds a defendant criminally responsible for his wrongful
acts. As a result, a GBMI offender is sentenced as if he had been
found "guilty," or fully blameworthy, for the offense. In theory,
a GBMI verdict purports to provide the GBMI prisoner with the
necessary mental health treatment.20 In reality, however, GBMI
offenders seldom receive mental health treatment during the
they thought might work, about 5,000 gay men gathered to release
their rage in the city's face.
FLETCHER, supra note 9, at 15.
16. See HENRY J. STEADMAN ET AL., BEFORE AND AFTER HINCKLEY:
EVALUATING INSANrY DEFENSE REFORM 39 (1993). In discussing the debate that
followed Hinckley's acquittal, the authors state, "[t]he reform following John
Hinckley's acquittal in 1982 represented legislative efforts to restore a balance
in the operation of the insanity defense between individual rights and public
protection, a balance that the public would deem acceptable." Id.
17. Other legislative reforms (aside from the guilty but mentally ill
verdict) involved measures that proposed abolishing the insanity defense,
modifying the 'test of insanity,' altering the burden of proof for the insanity
defense, and revising the commitment and release procedures for insanity
acquittees. Id. at 34-45.
18. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.040 (1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§§ 401(b), 408 (1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 115-2(b) (Smith-Hurd 1990); IND. CODE § 35-36-2-3 (Supp. 1982); Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 504.120 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 768.36 (1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-312 (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-
3 (Michie 1984 & Supp. 1994); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 314 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 17-24-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-26-14
(1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-16a-102 (Supp. 1993).
19. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-3 (D) (Michie 1984 & Supp. 1994).
20. See, e.g., Smith & Hall, supra note 7, at 78; DRESSLER, supra note 7, at
316-317. A "not guilty by reason of insanity" (NGRI) verdict, by contrast, does
not hold the defendant criminally liable for his wrongful acts. The NGRI
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course of their prison sentences.21 In order to understand the
GBMI verdict, it is first necessary to examine the verdict within
the context of the entire debate and the reform movement of the
early 1980's.
Although focusing on the attempted assassination of Reagan
as the "high water mark" for the reform movement may appear
to oversimplify the development of the guilty but mentally ill ver-
dict, the significance of Hinckley and its effects cannot be dis-
missed. On July 19, 1982, Dan Quayle, then a senator from
Indiana, summarized the public's mood at a hearing before the
United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Introducing a
bill which proposed reforming the federal insanity defense,
Quayle commended the committee's chairman for moving to
"strike while the iron is hot."22 Similarly, legislatures at both the
national and state level capitalized on public sentiment that
favored reducing the frequency with which the insanity defense
was used. During the twelve year period between 1978 and 1990,
a total of 124 different attempts to reform the insanity defense
occurred in 34 jurisdictions. Eighty per cent of these reforms
were enacted shortly after Hinckley's acquittal.23
The history of legislative reform in this area appears to have
been motivated in large measure by the public outrage that was
displayed throughout many jurisdictions after Hinckley's acquit-
tal. Many of the legislative initiatives that emerged in the post-
Hinckley reform movement were intended to address the public's
concerns about the use of diminished capacity defenses. 24  To a
defendant is acquitted outright and may then be committed to a mental health
institution.
21. See infra notes 43-47, 66 and accompanying text.
22. The Insanity Defense, 1982: Hearings on S. 818, S. 1106, S. 1558, S. 2669,
S. 2672, S. 2678, S. 2745, and S. 2780 Before the United States Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1982) [hereinafter Senate Hearings]
(statement of Sen. Dan Quayle). Senator Quayle's bill, while placing the
burden of proof on a criminal defendant to establish the insanity defense by a
preponderance of the evidence, also proposed a federal guilty but mentally ill
verdict. Id. at 19.
23. See STEADMAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 35. The authors also state that
of the 34 jurisdictions that enacted these various reforms (including altering
the burden of proof, changing the test of legal insanity, and revising
commitment and release procedures), "[t]hree states adopted the GBMI
verdict during the period of the Hinckley case, and eight adopted it shortly
after his June 1982 acquittal." Id. at 38. Furthermore, they also emphasize that
"[flew of these reforms could be construed as liberalizing the defense; nearly all
were aimed at making the insanity defense a less attractive option for the
defendant." Id. at 35.
24. An example of theses reforms, the guilty but mentally ill verdict, will
be discussed as an outgrowth of the Hinckley controversy.
1996]
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large extent, however, these initiatives were not conceived in a
political vacuum or in an atmosphere devoid of public pres-
sures. 5 The events following the trial of Dan White illustrate
how public sentiment can influence and shape such legislative
decision-making. This Article argues that such influences do not
necessarily produce penal statutes that conform to the tenets of
American criminal law jurisprudence.
The concept of a guilty but mentally ill verdict affects the
manner in which our penal system administers justice to mentally
ill individuals - a matter that implicates principles of law, ethics
and medicine. As a political solution to a legal, ethical and medi-
cal problem, the adequacy of such legislative reforms must be
evaluated carefully. Legal and ethical problems require adher-
ence to principles ofjustice and morality. Addressing the impor-
tance of the corresponding relationship between criminal
responsibility and the distribution of punishment, Professor H.
L. A. Hart noted that the admission of "excusing conditions"
such as mental illness "is required by distinct principles ofJustice
which restrict the extent to which general social aims may be pur-
sued at the cost of individuals."26 In a criminal justice system that
punishes blameworthy harmful conduct and shields blameless
offenders from punishment, any device that threatens this princi-
ple must be subjected to careful scrutiny - and deservedly so.
Politically popular solutions to these problems do not necessarily
conform to "contemporary standards of decency"27 that are
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."28 Because the
GBMI verdict implicates questions of justice that are central to
the integrity of our legal system, these reforms must be evaluated
to ensure that legislators properly balanced the competing con-
cerns of public safety and the rights of mentally ill defendants.
25. See, e.g., 'Dan White Bill,' Weaker Now, Gets Past Assembly, S.F. EXAMINER,
Sept. 11, 1979, at 7 ("Outrage over [White's] sentence led to demonstrations in
San Francisco's streets and demands for legislation tightening evidentiary rules
on such defenses."). During debate in the California Assembly over a bill
restricting the use of diminished capacity defenses, Assemblyman Alister
McAlister, a supporter of tighter restrictions, suggested that, "this is the time for
us to ... reverse these outrageous decisions and reassert legislative authority."
Id. In calling for a reversal of "these outrageous decisions," McAlister also was
referring to a trend of cases from the California Supreme Court. These cases
had construed the meaning of premeditation and deliberation (for purposes of
California's murder statute) to include the requirement that the defendant
could "maturely and meaningfully reflect upon the gravity of his contemplated
act." See, e.g., People v. Wolff, 394 P.2d. 959 (Cal. 1964).
26. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY. EssAys IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 17 (1968).
27. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (citations omitted).
28. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
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This Article will examine the operation of the guilty but
mentally ill verdict that emerged as a popular alternative from
the rush to reform the insanity defense. In particular, it will
focus on whether or not the verdict allows jurors to evade their
primary responsibility in a criminal trial - viz., the task of judg-
ing the moral culpability of a criminal defendant. Although a
brief discussion of limited psychological issues will prove to be
both relevant and necessary to this analysis, this Article does not
purport to address adequately the clinical issues that arise from
this discipline. This Article will, however, examine the level of
discernment employed by legislators and other contributors to
the policy-making debate. In doing so, the Article will focus on
the sufficiency with which the reformers addressed the legal and
ethical concerns at the foundation of the debate.
Part II of this Article will present some background on the
insanity defense and will analyze the different statutory versions
of the guilty but mentally ill verdict enacted by several jurisdic-
tions. Part II will further examine the context in which this type
of legislation was passed. Part III of this Article will examine the
ethical or moral questions implicated in this discussion of the
insanity defense, the GBMI verdict, and the subsequent disposi-
tion and treatment of mentally ill defendants. Part III will also
discuss various theories of culpability and punishment and then
will examine how the GBMI verdict corresponds to the concerns
of each. Part IV will discuss case law from various GBMI states
and will evaluate a prisoner's right to mental health treatment.
Part TV also will analyze Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual
punishment arguments that arise from the denial of psychologi-
cal or psychiatric treatment. Finally, Part V of this Article will
conclude with policy proposals and legislative options that
address the ethical concerns raised in the preceding sections.
This proposal seeks to restore to the jury its original task: examin-
ing the defendant's mental state for the purposes of judging his
culpability and responsibility for the offense. By removing treat-
ment and dispositional considerations from the realm of the jury
- decisions that are best reserved for mental health profession-
als - the revised verdict will ensure that jurors render an honest
judgment on a defendant's culpability. This goal may be
achieved by eliminating the guilty but mentally ill verdict's false
dichotomy - one that purports to consider the defendant's
mental illness for purposes of both culpability and sentencing.
19961
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II. THE GBMI VERDICT AND THE INSANITY DEFENSE
A. "Hinckley Plus" - The Impetus for GBMI
The acquittal of John Hinckley, although extremely impor-
tant as both a symbol and a source of the public's frustration and
concern, did not stand alone in the debate over the insanity
defense. Several other factors that either predated or coincided
with Hinckley's acquittal focused the attention of the legal com-
munity (and that of society as a whole) on how the penal system
addressed issues of mental illness.29 Paramount among these
concerns was the widely held public perception that insanity
acquittees might return to society after being confined in a
mental health care facility for only a relatively short period.
Developments in the fields of law and psychology have intensi-
fied this belief. Discussing the "special plea of insanity," Profes-
sor Norval Morris notes that "psychiatric practice and
constitutional decisions have facilitated the earlier release of
those found not guilty by reason of insanity than when the back
wards of mental hospitals held them for periods longer, on the
average, than they would have served had they been convicted of
their crimes."3" As a result of this perception, many jurisdictions
acted to curtail occurrences of NGRI acquittees being returned
to society after only a short period of confinement.
The state of Georgia, for example, enacted its GBMI ver-
dict31 to prevent insanity acquittees from gaining an "early
release" from mental health institutions:
As in Michigan, the GBMI verdict was adopted in Georgia
by the legislature as a response to a court ruling in which
the procedural safeguards for defendants acquitted on the
grounds of insanity were broadened. The GBMI verdict
was passed shortly after a U.S. District Court ruling in Ben-
ham v. Edwards (1980) that overturned the state's practice
of automatically committing all persons who had success-
29. See NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CIMINAL LAW 29-86 (1982).
Professor Morris discusses several underlying problems that plagued the
insanity defense and the modem system in the pre-Hinckley period. Among
these problems, Morris cites society's concern that insanity acquittees would be
released prematurely from mental health institutions. This perception was in
relation to the potential penal incarceration that the acquittee could have faced
if found simply "guilty."
30. Id. at 34-35 ("Again, public anxiety fueled political concern that this
defense was becoming a contrivance, a subterfuge, and that even where it was
validly pleaded the public should not be expected to bear the risk of further
criminal acts by those who escaped punishment because of their mental
illness.").
31. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (1985).
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fully raised the insanity defense. The court ruled that
Georgia's procedures were unconstitutional.32
The enactment of Georgia's GBMI statute is a "clear example of
state efforts to safeguard the public interest in the wake of a
series of judicial rulings that broadened the procedural safe-
guards of insanity defendants.""3 It is only against this back-
ground - the motivations of the movement to reform the
insanity defense - that the GBMI verdict may be evaluated
properly.
A recent New York study suggests that some of the fears at
the heart of the reform movement's momentum may have been
misplaced. 4 According to the study, insanity acquittees in cer-
tain categories actually were confined for longer periods than
those defendants who had been found guilty of the same
offenses. Steadman et al. conducted a study on the length of
periods for which various types of insanity acquittees (NGRI) and
convicts (guilty) were confined. They concluded that for
offenses described as "other violent crimes" such as rape, kidnap-
ping and assault (but not including murder), "insanity acquittees
were confined for longer periods of time than those found guilty
on the same charges." In fact, insanity acquittees served nearly
twice as long as those found guilty." According to the study, the
32. STEADMAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 104-105 (citing Benham v.
Edwards, 501 F. Supp. 1050 (N.D. Ga. 1980)). The district court in Benham
invalidated Georgia's civil commitment procedures which automatically
committed all defendants who were found not guilty by reason of insanity.
Furthermore, the Benham decision also rejected Georgia's presumption of
continuing insanity that governed the state's release procedures for insanity
acquittees. After the court ordered hearings for all insanity acquittees to
determine whether or not they met involuntary commitment standards, "55 of
the 127 insanity acquittees confined [in Georgia] were released." STEADMAN ET
AL., supra note 16, at 104-105.
33. STEADMAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 104-105 ("The cumulative effects
of these rulings mandated that the commitment and release procedures of
insanity acquittees closely resemble those required for civil commitments.").
34. Id. at 98.
35. Id. The Steadman study examined the periods of confinement for
both insanity acquittees and convicts in three categories of crimes: murder,
other violent crimes (physical assault, rape, and kidnaping), and non-violent
crimes (robbery, property offenses, and other minor offenses). According to
the study:
We also compared the lengths of confinement of defendants pleading
insanity who were found guilty with those acquitted NGRI. Contrary
to popular belief, insanity acquittees in New York were confined as
long or longer than those found guilty. Although there was no
difference in the length of confinement of insanity acquittees and
those found guilty of murder, there were significant differences for
the other two categories, other violent crimes and nonviolent crimes.
1996]
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same trend held true for non-violent crimes (e.g., property
offenses and robbery). In cases of murder (categorized in the
study as "violent crime") the length of confinement for those
defendants found guilty and for insanity acquittees was nearly
identical.3 6
The possibility that the reform's motivating factors were
falsely held may influence how one assesses the products of
reform. The factual predicate for the reform movement - viz.,
concern about insanity acquittees gaining early release - was
central to arguments that legislative solutions properly balanced
the competing interests of public safety and the individual rights
of mentally ill defendants. If insanity acquittees were in fact con-
fined for longer periods than those found guilty, then public
safety was not threatened to the degree that many reform propo-
nents had argued. 7 If this proposition is true, legislators
improperly compromised the rights of mentally ill defendants to
compensate for an erroneous or overstated fear.
Other misperceptions also may have fueled attempts to
reform the insanity defense in the early 1980's. Many of these
stimuli, although factually inaccurate, were accepted by society
and by the legal and legislative communities."a This factor solidi-
fies the need to examine the reform movement and the effects
For these crimes, insanity acquittees were confined for longer periods
of time than those found guilty on similar charges. The median
length of stay for those found NGRI for other violent offenses was 5.25
years compared to 2.7 years for those found guilty - nearly twice as
long. Similarly, for nonviolent offenses, the median length of stay for
NGRI acquittees was 2.8 years compared to 8.5 months for those found
guilty - nearly four times as long. It is important to note that the
long lengths of stay for insanity acquittees was not due to the (insanity
defense) reform; we found no changes in length of confinement due
to the reform.
Id. at 98 (emphasis in original).
36. Id.
37. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
38. See John Q. LaFond and Mary Durham, Cognitive Dissonance: Have
Insanity and Civil Commitment Reforms Made a Difference, 39 VIL. L. REv. 92-96
(1994). LaFond and Durham cite numerous studies and statistics which
demonstrate the breadth of the public's misinformation with respect to the
insanity defense. Specifically, the authors accentuate the common
misperceptions that the insanity defense is used more often and with greater
success than is actually the case. See id. at 92 & n.100 - n.104. LaFond and
Durham assert that:
[A] recent study of eight American cities found that the insanity plea
was used in only one per cent of felony cases. Of these felons who
plead insanity, only about twenty-six per cent are successful in
convincing a judge and jury to excuse them from their crime.
Although it is rarely used, and seldom successful, attorneys, judges,
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that it has had on the penal system - specifically the rights of
mentally ill defendants. Although calls for reform were fueled by
emotion and popular sentiment in favor of safeguarding public
safety, prudence and justice mandate that we examine whether
or not the individual rights of mentally ill defendants were
improperly sacrificed. This discussion will necessarily focus on
how jurors in a GBMI jurisdiction regard the GBMI offender's
assertion of mental illness. If jurors examine the GBMI
offender's mental state at the time he committed the offense for
the purpose of deciding treatment or post-guilt phase disposition, then
the GBMI verdict corrupts the jurors' role. If, however, jurors
examine the GBMI defendant's mental state at the time he com-
mitted the offense for the purpose ofjudging the defendant's culpabil-
ity and criminal responsibility, then the GBMI verdict may be
classified as a "proper" jury device.
B. The Role of the Jurors: With and Without a GBM[ Option
Against a background of public sentiment in favor of
reforming the insanity defense, many jurisdictions enacted the
guilty but mentally ill verdict.3 9 The GBMI verdict contributes an
additional dynamic to the already difficult task that faces jurors
in a criminal trial. In a system without a GBMI option, ajury may
choose from only two options other than the "not guilty" verdict
- "guilty" or "not guilty by reason of insanity" (NGRI) - when
confronted with a defendant who asserts a diminished capacity
defense in the face of evidence that establishes beyond a reason-
able doubt that the defendant engaged in the conduct alleged in
the indictment. Critics of this two-choice system argue that
jurors are precluded from addressing "shades of culpability" that
they detect while assessing a defendant's mental illness. Profes-
sor Norman J. Finkel notes that "traditional insanity tests.., ask
for an all-or-none culpability decision: in essence, the jury must
find the defendant [who engaged in the forbidden conduct]
either guilty or NGRI."4° Finkel also claims that this "all-or-none"
approach "fails to reflect the complex culpability judgments that
legislators, mental health workers and the general public believe the
insanity defense is widely used to avoid punishment.
Id,. at 92-93.
39. Specifically, thirteen states enacted a form of the GBMI verdict.
Michigan was the first to pass such a statute in 1975. After Michigan, the other
twelve states to enact the GBMI verdict were: Alaska, Delaware, Georgia,
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Montana, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah. See statutes cited supra note 18.
40. Finkel & Slobogin, supra note 7, at 449 (emphasis added).
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jurors often make in insanity cases .... ,,41 The decision that
faces jurors is indeed a difficult one. This difficult decision -
assessing the defendant's culpability - must be made in order
for the criminal justice system to operate effectively. As part of a
system that shields blameless offenders from punishment, jurors
assume the responsibility of safeguarding the rights of mentally
ill defendants. At the same time, the community's interest in
punishing blameworthy defendants for their harmful conduct
also rests with the members of the jury. If these two competing
interests of the penal system are to be addressed, then jurors,
despite the difficult nature of the task, must render an honest
judgment regarding the culpability and criminal responsibility of
mentally ill defendants.
Addressing the concerns of those who criticize the "all-or-
none" culpability decision in a two-choice system, the guilty but
mentally ill verdict presents jurors with a third option. While the
details of the statute vary according to jurisdiction, the disposi-
tion of the defendant who is found guilty but mentally ill gener-
ally remains unchanged. By finding the defendant guilty of the
offense charged, the GBMI option allows jurors to address the
harmful act committed against society. At the same time, the ver-
dict also allows jurors - by finding that the defendant suffered
from a mental illness at the time he committed the offense and
by labelling him "mentally ill" - to address their hesitations
about punishing a mentally ill defendant.4" The guilty but men-
tally ill verdict is therefore a more rigid verdict than not guilty by
reason of insanity. While the defendant found NGRI will likely
be committed to a treatment facility and therefore may become
eligible for release, the GBMI defendant, if convicted, may serve
the statutory maximum prison sentence.43
41. Id. at 450. Finkel has recently elaborated on the nature of what he
calls the "all-or-none" approach of a two-choice system. According to Finkel,
"[i]f people see 'grey' but insanity is described as 'black-or-white,' then jurors
have another problem: they must fit 'grey' into one of two categories, neither of
which matches their judgment." Norman J. Finkel, Culpability and Commonsense
Justice: Lessons Learned Betwixt Murder and Madness, 10 NoTRE DAMEJ. L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'Y 11, 40 (1996).
42. For statutory purposes, it is important to note that the jury
determination of mental illness under the GBMI verdict falls below the
definition of legal insanity. The difference between the two terms - and how
medicine and law define or diagnose the two - is not exactly clear. This
inability to distinguish the terms and, more importantly, the clinical conditions
themselves, suggest the inconsistent and arbitrary nature of GBMI verdicts. See
infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
43. See LaFond and Durham, supra note 38, at 71.
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As a result, the GBMI verdict may alleviate jurors' fears that
they have not adequately addressed the defendant's mental ill-
ness. Although this third option - GBMI - may address the
concerns of critics such as Finkel who argue that jurors detect
"shades of culpability," the dangers of the verdict outweigh its
advantages. An additional option for jurors, such as the GBMI
verdict, allows them to "hedge their bets" and evade their respon-
sibility. When presented with evidence of mental illness, many
jurors may hesitate to punish an individual whom they view as
less blameworthy than the severity of a guilty verdict would other-
wise indicate. Similarly, jurors may hesitate to acquit a mentally
ill defendant due to the possibility that he may readily return to
society uncured. This difficult decision, the assessment of the
defendant's culpability, must be made for the criminal justice sys-
tem to operate effectively. In its current form, the guilty but
mentally ill verdict allows jurors to evade this task of judging
whether or not a defendant's mental illness negates - or at the
very least reduces - culpability and criminal responsibility. The
GBMI verdict examines the defendant's mental illness at the time
of the offense for the purpose of treatment (and sentencing)
rather than for the purpose of determining his criminal responsi-
bility. As a result, the GBMI verdict compromises a major prem-
ise of the Anglo-American jury system and Anglo-American
criminal law.
In addition to these concerns, the significance attached to
the jury's finding of mental illness is also suspect when it is the
product of a GBMI verdict. Despite a jury's determination that
the defendant was "mentally ill," a GBMI defendant is sentenced
as if he had been found simply "guilty." Steadman et al. correctly
state that "[d]efendants found GBMI are sentenced in the same
manner as others who have been convicted. GBMI laws vary as to
the requirements for the provision of mental health care during incarcera-
tion."" The last sentence of this statement is perhaps the most
troubling aspect of the guilty but mentally ill verdict. The logisti-
cal considerations of delivering mental health treatment to a
GBMI prisoner - provisions that specify who is to receive mental
health treatment once placed into the system, and what type of
treatment is to be administered - are seldom sufficiently enu-
merated under the current statutes. In fact, some jurisdictions
have adopted versions of the GBMI statute which do not guaran-
tee that the jury's determination of mental illness will ever be
addressed after the guilt phase of the trial:
44. STEADMAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 38 (emphasis added).
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If a defendant is found GBMI, he may be sent either to a
psychiatric facility for treatment or to prison for punish-
ment .... An even harsher version of the GBMI defense
allows the jury to convict the defendant while also expres-
sing its opinion that he was mentally ill at the time of the
offense. Following conviction, offenders found GBMI may,
but need not, be offered psychiatric treatment while
incarcerated.4 5
In most jurisdictions, the GBMI statute fails to guarantee
psychiatric treatment for the defendant who has been adjudi-
cated mentally ill.' In practice, the treatment provisions in most
GBMI statutes are rendered illusory by the manner in which the
statute itself operates. Perhaps most disturbing is the reality that
"[c]ontrary to the expectation that accompanied GBMI legisla-
tion, GBMI offenders are no more likely to receive treatment
than mentally ill offenders in the general inmate population who
have not been found GBMI."4 7 As a result, the guilty but men-
tally ill verdict raises serious ethical and legal concerns. By
allowing jurors to evade their primary responsibility (judging the
defendant's culpability for his actions), and by failing to guaran-
tee mental health treatment, the GBMI verdict detracts from the
effectiveness and integrity of the criminal justice system.
C. Varying Structures of the GBMI Statute
Most GBMI inmates discover the harsh reality of the GBMI
verdict after they are sentenced and placed into the correctional
system. The source of this reality is the failure of most states to
guarantee psychiatric treatment to GBMI inmates. This failure
can be traced to the structure and the language of the various
GBMI statutes. This aspect of insanity defense reform remains
among the most troubling for legislators who seek to strike a
proper balance between the competing interests at issue: public
safety and the rights of the mentally ill defendant. The difficulty
inherent in such a task is readily apparent when one examines
the thirteen different GBMI statutes that are on the books.
Although the treatment clauses in differing versions of the
GBMI statutes contain substantial variations, the basic structural
elements of the guilty but mentally ill verdict remain largely uni-
form from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Three basic elements are
45. LaFond and Durham, supra note 38, at 84 (emphasis added).
46. Id. at 103.
47. Id. ("GBMI offenders are eligible for treatment in most states only if a
post-conviction mental health evaluation indicates such a need and, then, only if
such resources are available to provide it. ") (emphasis added).
THE GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL VERDICT
common to nearly all thirteen GBMI statutes. The statutes
require the trier of fact to address all three elements before find-
ing a defendant guilty but mentally ill. New Mexico's guilty but
mentally ill statute, for example, clearly illustrates the necessary
elements:
When a defendant has asserted a defense of insanity, the
court may find the defendant guilty but mentally ill if after
hearing all of the evidence the court finds beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant:
(1) is guilty of the offense charged;
(2) was mentally ill at the time of the commission of
the offense; and
(3) was not legally insane at the time of the commis-
sion of the offense. 48
Although nearly all thirteen of the GBMI jurisdictions retain
these basic and common statutory elements, several jurisdictions
vary the burden of proof required for the second and third
prongs of the statute.49 Most states, however, require that all
three elements must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Other states, such as South Carolina, require the defendant to
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was mentally
ill at the time he committed the offense.5' Still other jurisdic-
tions completely eliminate this third prong (that "the defendant
was not legally insane at the time of the commission of the
offense") from the statutory scheme. 51
Throughout this discussion of the guilty but mentally ill ver-
dict, it is important to note the distinction between "legal
insanity" and "mental illness." New Mexico, for example, distin-
guishes the two classifications within the text of its statutes:
"[M]entally ill" means a substantial disorder of thought,
mood or behavior which afflicted a person at the time of
48. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-3(D) (Michie 1984 & Supp. 1994).
49. This article will not examine Due Process arguments that stem from
shifting the burden to the criminal defendant on the issue of mental illness.
For an examination of these arguments see, e.g., Note, The Guilty But Mentally Ill
Verdict and Due Process, 92 YALE L. J. 475 (1983).
50. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-20(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994). The
South Carolina statute illustrates this dichotomy:
To return a verdict of "guilty but mentally ill" the burden of proof is
upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt to the trier of fact
that the defendant committed the crime, and the burden ofproof is upon
the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that when he
committed the crime he was mentally ill. .
Id. (emphasis added).
51. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 504.130 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990).
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the commission of the offense and which impaired that
person's judgment, but not to the extent that he did not
know what he was doing or understand the consequences
of his act or did not know that his act was wrong or could
not prevent himself from committing the act.5
2
This distinction between "mental illness" and "legal insanity" is
important to the determination of which defendants will meet
the eligibility requirements under each statute. In practice, how-
ever, this distinction is not easily applied. Professor Finkel has
discussed the difficulty inherent in defining the differences
between "mental illness" and "legal insanity." Finkel believes that
the two terms have become separated and identifiable exclusively
with only one discipline (either medicine or law, respectively)."
As a result, "medicalized definitions of 'mental illness' and
'insanity' leave these terms outside ordinary thinking, removing
insanity from its proper moral context."5 4 The GBMI verdict's
expectation that jurors will be able to draw such a distinction is
52. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-3(a) (Michie 1984 & Supp. 1994).
Kentucky's GBMI statute also draws a clear definitional distinction between
"mental illness" and "legal insanity." According to the Kentucky legislature's
definition:
"Mental illness" means substantially impaired capacity to use self-
control, judgment, or discretion in the conduct of one's affairs and
social relations associated with maladaptive behavior or reduction in
emotional symptoms where impaired capacity or maladaptive
behavior, or emotional symptoms can be related to physiological,
psychological, or other factors.
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 504.060 (6) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990). The Kentucky
statute also defines "insanity" to mean "that as a result of mental incapacitation,
lack of substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of one's conduct
or to conform one's conduct to the requirements of the law." Id.
53. See NORMAN J. FINKEL, INsANrr ON TRIAL 73 (1988). Finkel explains
this phenomenon and notes that it has become generally accepted by some.
The historical courtship and developing contention between the
disciplines of law and psychology seems to have produced an
understanding that "insanity" is a legal, not psychiatric, concept. In
the process of differentiating "insanity" from "mental illness," a
corollary has emerged and gained the status, in some quarters, of a
self-evident truth: the corollary asserts that mental disease is a medical
concept, and one that the medio-psychological expert is uniquely, if
not solely, qualified to address. Some are no doubt content with this
decoupling. After all, the error of the alienists - of conflating "the
two quite distinct concepts" of legal insanity and mental illness - has
been undone....
Id.
54. Finkel, supra note 41, at 36. Finkel also points to arguments
advocating a "commonsense" perspective on the definition or test for legal
insanity - one which moves away from medicalized, symptom-based tests for
mental illness and insanity. This approach would- reflect a "proper moral
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therefore problematic. If experts trained in the discipline of psy-
chology grapple with this distinction, assigning such a task to lay
jurors introduces confusion into the system. As the New' Mexico
statute indicates, a defendant who at the time of the commission
of an offense was not legally insane but was "suffering from a
mental illness is not relieved of criminal responsibility for his
conduct and may be found guilty but mentally ill."55 This distinc-
tion forms the basis for continuing to hold GBMI defendants
morally blameworthy for their actions despite the jury's finding
of mental illness. The validity of this distinction stands at the
center of the debate over the guilty but mentally ill verdict and
the culpability constraint on the Anglo-American system of crimi-
nal justice - an issue that will be addressed in greater detail in
Section III.C. of this Article.
Another forceful objection to the guilty but mentally ill ver-
dict relates to shortcomings in the delivery of psychological or
psychiatric treatment to mentally ill prisoners. The procedural
vagueness which legislatures built into their GBMI statutes high-
lights a disturbing trend. The overwhelming majority ofjurisdic-
tions vest broad discretion in the various correctional or mental
health departments to determine the need for psychiatric treat-
ment.56 Consequently, such treatment is not mandated in a
GBMI scheme despite a jury verdict stating that the defendant
was mentally ill at the time of the offense. This aspect of the
GBMI verdict raises serious questions about the propriety of such
statutes. This is not to suggest that jurors ought to diagnose the
GBMI defendant's mental state at the time of the trial; nor does
it suggest that jurors should have the final word as to how the
GBMI defendant ought to be treated for a mental illness. Jurors
should not be mislead, however, by an illusory statutory provision
which suggests, but often fails to deliver, mental health treatment
for GBMI inmates.
The approach taken by the thirteen guilty but mentally ill
statutes with respect to sentencing and treatment can be divided,
for the purpose of analysis, into two categories. Each of the thir-
teen statutes begins its sentencing and treatment provision with
substantially the same prefatory phrase. Basically, each statute
provides that "[t]he court may impose any sentence upon a
defendant who has been convicted of the same offense without a
judgment, resting on the moral principles that underlie ordinary people's
understanding of sane and insane." Id. at 37.
55. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-3 (A) (Michie 1984 & Supp. 1994).
56. See Christopher Slobogin, The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Idea
Whose Time Should Not Have Come, 53 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 494, 512-515 (1985).
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finding of mental illness."57 Following this clause, however, the
two types of statutes differ greatly in their sentencing and treat-
ment provisions. The difference relates to the manner in which
ajurisdiction approaches the delivery of mental health treatment
and to the deference which it gives to correctional or mental
health administrators. The fatal flaw in the GBMI system occurs
when GBMI offenders do not receive psychiatric or psychological
treatment. These jurisdictions (those that defer to correctional
agencies the judgment of whether a GBMI defendant should
receive mental health treatment) often permit the jury's determi-
nation of mental illness to be superseded by the opinion of cor-
rectional administrators. As a matter of medical ethics, this
arrangement is entirely appropriate. Jurors who expect GBMI
defendants to receive such treatment, however, are mislead by
the system. This reality in effect renders the jury's judgment on
the issue of mental illness illusory and compromises the integrity
of the GBMI verdict. The jury's finding may be rendered "illu-
sory" because no significance (aside from mere semantics) is
attached to the label. In the end, the jury's determination that
the defendant was mentally ill neither guarantees mental health
treatment nor mitigates the defendant's legal culpability.
Of the two types of statutory schemes, the best type of GBMI
statute guarantees that psychiatric or psychological treatment will
be delivered to each defendant who is found guilty but mentally
ill. Only three of the thirteen GBMI jurisdictions have structured
their statutes in such a manner as to comply with this goal.5"
Alaska's GBMI statute, for example, provides that:
The Department of Corrections shall provide mental
health treatment to a defendant found guilty but mentally
ill. The treatment must continue until the defendant no
longer suffers from a mental disease or defect that causes
the defendant to be dangerous to the public peace or
safety.59
Jurisdictions with GBMI statutes similar to Alaska's will be desig-
nated, for the purpose of this article, as "Type I" jurisdictions.
Kentucky and South Carolina have enacted GBMI statutes that
57. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-4 (Michie 1984 & Supp. 1994).
Several jurisdictions vary in use of the phrase 'may impose' to read either 'shall
impose' or 'must impose.' See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 504.150(1) (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-70 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
58. The three states are Alaska, Kentucky and South Carolina.
59. ALAsKA STAT. § 12.47.050 (b) (1990) (emphasis added).
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are substantially similar to Alaska's statute.6' The text of the
Alaska statute also stipulates that a defendant receiving treatment
under the GBMI statute may not be released and must serve the
remainder of his or her sentence after treatment has terminated.
At a minimum, the three Type I jurisdictions, although they do
not specify precisely the levels of treatment that are required,
guarantee that the jury's finding of mental illness will be
honored. Furthermore, the three Type Ijurisdictions assure that
providing treatment to defendants will take priority over bare
penal incarceration for their offenses.
The second type of guilty but mentally ill statute appears in
the ten remaining GBMIjurisdictions ("Type II" jurisdictions).61
Type Ijurisdictions, best represented by South Carolina's GBMI
statute,62 emphasize the goal of-treating the GBMI offender to
the same degree that they emphasize incarceration. South Caro-
lina, for example, pledges first to treat the GBMI offender and
then to incarcerate him. Conversely, Type II jurisdictions primar-
ily emphasize the initial incarceration of the defendant. In addi-
tion, Type II jurisdictions fail to guarantee that mental health
professionals will address the jury's finding of mental illness.
The vast majority of Type Iljurisdictions have enacted GBMI stat-
utes which provide that:
The court may impose any sentence upon a defendant
which could be imposed pursuant to law upon a defendant
who has been convicted of the same offense without a find-
ing of mental illness; provided that if the defendant is sen-
60. See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 504.150 (1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-70 (A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994). Kentucky's statute
provides:
The court shall sentence a defendant found guilty but mentally ill at
the time of the offense to the local jail or to the Department of
Corrections in the same manner as a defendant found guilty. If the
defendant is found guilty but mentally ill, treatment shall be provided the
defendant until the treating professional determines that treatment is no longer
necessay or until the expiration of his sentence, whichever occurs first.
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.150 (1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990) (emphasis
added). Similarly, South Carolina's statute states:
If the sentence imposed upon the (GBMI) defendant includes the
incarceration of the defendant, the defendant must first be taken to afacil-
ity designated by the Department of Corrections for treatment and retained there
until in the opinion of the staff at that facility the defendant may safely be
moved to the general population of the Department of Corrections to
serve the remainder of his sentence.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-70 (A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
61. Type II jurisdictions include Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana,
Michigan, Montana, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Utah.
62. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-70 (A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
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tenced to the custody of the corrections department, the
department shall examine the nature, extent, continuance and
treatment of the defendant's mental illness and shall provide psy-
chiatric, psychologica4 and other counseling and treatment for the
defendant as it deems necessaly.63
Indeed, most of the Type IIjurisdictions require the Department
of Corrections to examine the GBMI defendant and provide
such treatment as "it deems necessary" or "as it deems psychiatri-
cally indicated." Georgia, for example, states that once a GBMI
offender is in a penal facility, he "shall be further evaluated and
treated within the limits of state funds appropriated' and as "psychiat-
rically indicated."" By qualifying and conditioning the require-
ment for mental health treatment, many Type II states erode the
effectiveness of the GBMI verdict. These statutes weaken a state's
ability to properly address the treatment needs of offenders who
are neither legally insane nor fully blameworthy for their
offenses.
The pivotal phrase "as it deems necessary" distinguishes the
procedural operation of Type II jurisdictions from that found in
Type I-states. This phrase effectively enables Type IIjurisdictions
to disregard the jury's determination that the defendant was
mentally ill at the time the offense was committed. If ajury finds
a defendant guilty but mentally ill, and the state corrections
department later determines that the defendant does not need
treatment, the GBMI verdict has been rendered illusory. In this
situation, the disposition of the GBMI offender will mirror that
of a defendant who is simply found "guilty" of the offense. The
objection to the GBMI verdict is therefore clear: the GBMI ver-
dict has no real effect apart from merely distinguishing GBMI
offenders from other prisoners by labeling them "guilty but men-
tally ill.""5 As a result, jurors who believe that they had distin-
guished the GBMI defendant from the guilty defendant would
discover (ifjurors were informed of what happens to the defend-
ant after their verdict was rendered) that the system treats the
two classes of defendants almost identically. In its operation
(especially in Type II jurisdictions) the GBMI verdict poses pro-
cedural obstacles to delivering mental health treatment to a
defendant whom the jury has judged to be mentally ill.
63. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-4 (Michie 1984 & Supp. 1994) (emphasis
added).
64. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (g) (2) (1985) (emphasis added).
65. See Bradley D. McGraw, et al., The 'Guilty But Mentally Ill' Plea and
Verdict: Current State of Knowledge, 30 ViLL. L. Rsv. 117, 121 n.8 (1985). McGraw
et al. also recount the widespread criticism of the GBMI verdict by scholars who
describe it as "conceptually flawed and procedurally problematic."
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It is important to note that a jury's determination of mental
illness does not always comport with the finding of the mental
health expert who examines the defendant in a correctional or
mental health care facility. These mental health exams do not
always expose the need for mental health treatment, nor do they
guarantee its delivery.66 Although I will concede that ethical con-
siderations preclude a mental health care expert from treating a
patient based solely on the opinion of a lay jury, the GBMI system
nevertheless must honor the jury's determination of mental ill-
ness at some meaningful level. If the GBMI scheme fails to
ensure that state officials will address (for the purpose of treating
the GBMI inmate) the jury's determination of mental illness,
then at the very least, the issue of mental illness must be
addressed for the purpose ofjudging the defendant's legal culpa-
bility. The question of culpability - a question that examines
the defendant's capacity to choose and to act - implicates the
extent to which the penal system ought to punish criminal
defendants. In order to determine whether or not the GBMI ver-
dict comports with Anglo-American standards ofjustice, it is nec-
essary to examine the GBMI scheme and whether it compromises
the jury's role ofjudging the defendant's culpability. In order to
answer the question of whether or not the GBMI verdict should
be retained, critics and opponents must evaluate how well the
statute meets its objectives, and how well it balances the compet-
ing interests of the community.
III. A MAT'ER OF PRINCIPLE: CuLPABuIITY, ETHICS, AND THE
GBMI VERDICT
A. The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict Has Failed to Achieve Its
Goals
The viability of the guilty but mentally ill option depends
upon whether the GBMI statutes properly balance the competing
interests of public safety and the rights of individual defendants.
The guilty but mentally ill verdict was enacted primarily to ease
public concern and fear over the number of NGRI defendants
who are acquitted and who could potentially gain their release
shortly after being committed.6 7 In addition, the GBMI verdict
66. See LaFond and Durham, supra note 38, at 103 ("Although at least
ninety per cent of GBMI offenders actually receive post-conviction mental
health evaluations, studies indicate that some form of treatment is
recommended in only 64% - 72% of cases.").
67. See McGraw et al., supra note 65, at 121. McGraw summarizes the
goals of the GBMI verdict and offers several reasons why such statutes were
enacted:
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ostensibly addresses issues related to the defendant's mental
health and treatment needs. The guilty but mentally ill verdict
has failed to meet both of these goals and therefore should not
continue in its current form. Although the GBMI verdict has suc-
ceeded in providing jurors with an attractive option to either a
NGRI verdict or a simple "guilty" verdict, in practice legislators
have failed to provide jurors with an option that actually delivers
what it promises. Although the GBMI verdict provides a label
(guilty but mentally ill) that is less severe than "guilty," the ver-
dict often provides defendants with a sentence that is no less
harsh than that which a guilty verdict would provide.
The American Bar Association in 1989 published its Crimi-
nal Justice Mental Health Standards, in which it stated that
"[s]tatutes which supplant or supplement the verdict of not
guilty by reason of mental nonresponsibility [insanity] with a ver-
dict of guilty but mentally ill should not be enacted."' After rais-
ing preliminary questions about the constitutionality of a GBMI
option,69 the ABA standards also assert that GBMI statutes have
failed to accomplish their goals. Citing a 1982 Michigan study on
that state's GBMI verdict,7" the ABA noted that "the number of
nonresponsibility acquittals in Michigan since passage of the
1975 GBMI statute has actually increased. Ironically, it is likely
that one reason for this increase has been the GBMI verdict
itself."71
Unlike the NGRI and "guilty but insane" verdicts, which hold the
defendant blameless, a GBMI verdict holds the defendant criminally
responsible for the offense. Thus, it allows imposition of the same
sentence that could be given a defendant found guilty of the offense,
yet promises mental health evaluation or treatment during the term of
the sentence. Prompted by highly publicized cases . . . legislators
hoped that the GBMI verdict would offer jurors an attractive
alternative to the NGRI verdict and thereby prevent the early release
of dangerous insanity acquittees.
Id.
68. AMERICAN BAR ASSoCIATION, ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH
STANDARDS § 7-6.10, at 389 (1989).
69. Id. at 391-392 (arguing that many GBMI statutes may be
unconstitutional on their face since they do not 'accord exculpatory
significance to even the type of gross psychosis that would preclude requisite
mens rea').
70. Id. at 392 (citing GA. Smith & JA. Hall, Evaluating Michigan's Guilty
But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Empirical Study, 16 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 77 (1982)).
71. AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, supra note 68, § 7-6.10, at 392 (noting
that "[d]efendants who ordinarily would not have pleaded mental non-
responsibility [insanity] may now do so, on the theory that even if they are
unsuccessful, on the responsibility issue they may avoid outright conviction and
imprisonment through a GBMI finding."). Similarly, in his 1982 testimony
before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Rudolph Giuliani, at the time
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Although the increase in NGRI acquittals over the six-year
period was negligible,72 the Michigan study concluded that
"to the extent that the insanity defense remains unaffected by the
GBMI verdict, the GBMI statute has failed to meet its goal of
reducing NGRI acquittals."73 South Dakota, for example,
enacted its GBMI statute for the precise purpose of reducing the
number of criminal defendants who are found not guilty by rea-
son of insanity." According to the ABA, however, adding the
GBMI option encourages defendants to plead mental nonre-
sponsibility. These defendants, hoping to be found at least guilty
but mentally ill, may actually receive an erroneous NGRI acquit-
tal. By increasing the pool of defendants who plead mental non-
responsibility, the GBMI option may increase -the likelihood of
NGRI acquittals.
Trends and statistics such as those found in the state of
Michigan (and cited by the American Bar Association) indicate
that the guilty but mentally ill verdict has failed to reduce both
the number of defendants who assert the insanity defense and
the number of defendants who are found not guilty by reason of
insanity.75 Thus, as to the first prong of the competing interests
Associate Attorney General of the United States, stated, "[t]hat is why we have
real reservations about the 'guilty but mentally ill' approach. It'sjust inherently
confusing and unless you define 'mentally ill' narrowly it's going to actually, in
our view, expand the number of situations in which you could assert insanity...
" See Senate Hearings, supra note 22, at 45.
72. The Michigan study conducted by Smith and Hall examined the
number of NGRI acquittals (as a percentage of the total number of adult males
who were charged with crimes) during the four-year period (1971-1975) prior
to the enactment of the GBMI verdict, and the number of NGRI acquittals in
the six-year period (1976-1981) after the GBMI verdict was enacted. According
to the results, in the four years prior to implementation of the GBMI verdict an
average of 0.025% of adult males charged with crimes were found NGRI.
Similarly, after six years with the GBMI verdict the study found an average
0.026% of adult males charged with crimes were found NGRI. See Smith & Hall,
supra note 7, at 93.
73. Smith & Hall, supra note 7, at 101. See also Caton F. Roberts et aL,
Implicit Theories of Criminal Responsibility: Decision Making and the Insanity Defense,
11 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 207, 222 (1987).
74. Robinson v. Solem, 432 N.W.2d 246, 248 (S.D. 1988). The Supreme
Court of South Dakota determined that "our legislature intended to provide an
alternative verdict available to a jury to reduce the number of offenders who were
erroneously found not guilty by reason of insanity." Id. (emphasis added).
75. See INGO KEI=TZ ET AL., THE INsANrrY DEFENSE AND ITS ALTERNATwES:
A GuIDE FOR PoucmiAKERs 43 (1984). Summarizing a study of Michigan's
GBMI verdict, Keilitz writes that "[p]roponents and critics of the GBMI verdict
anticipated that the verdict would cause a substantial decrease in the number of
NGRI acquittals. An empirical analysis of the GBMI verdict indicates that the
verdict has not functioned as expected .... Thus, to the extent the GBMI
verdict was intended to decrease NGRI acquittals, it has failed." Id.
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which the GBMI verdict seeks to balance - public safety - the
legislative initiative has not accomplished its goal. Similarly, the
GBMI verdict also has failed to safeguard the rights of mentally ill
defendants and inmates.76 By requiring mental health treat-
ment only when the state "deems it necessary" or is able to afford
it,77 many GBMI jurisdictions (especially those designated as
Type II jurisdictions) effectively subordinate treatment needs to
the goal of punitive incarceration. In fact, GBMI offenders
receive mental health treatment in only two-thirds of all cases.7"
In addition to Eighth Amendment considerations79 and the fail-
ure to guarantee mental health treatment, the GBMI option, as
an improper jury device, also threatens the rights of defendants
and the integrity of the judicial system.
B. Confusing the System: The GBMI Option and Standards of
Justice
Observers of the criminal justice system may yield to the
temptation of disregarding how the guilty but mentally ill verdict
affects a key member of the judicial system: the juror. Through-
out this discussion of the GBMI verdict the juror has been men-
tioned frequently. Despite an inclination to focus primarily on
the parties "directly" involved in the criminal litigation (i.e., the
defendant and society), we must eschew a similar inclination to
minimalize the impact that this additional verdict may have on
our jury system. Despite the relative simplicity of most GBMI
statutes and their wording, the task assigned to the jury is often
complex. In any jury system (whether it be a two-choice system
or a three-choice system),8 jurors are asked to make difficult
76. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text (discussing the
likelihood that many GBMI offenders, once in the prison system, will not be
treated any differently than those offenders who have been found guilty).
77. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text (discussing conditions
under which some states will offer mental health treatment to GBMI offenders).
Georgia, for example, states that GBMI offenders shall be further treated
"within the limits of state funds appropriated."
78. See LaFond and Durham, supra note 38, at 103 (noting that treatment
is recommended in only 64% to 72% of all GBMI cases in which the offender
has received a mental health evaluation).
79. Eighth Amendment questions concerning GBMI offenders'
constitutional right to mental health treatment will be discussed in section IV of
this Article.
80. See Finkel, supra note 41, at 40-43. Finkel speaks of the choices (other
than a simple "guilty" verdict) that are available to jurors when confronted with
a mentally ill defendant. Specifically, the two choice system allows for a "not
guilty" verdict or a "not guilty by reason of insanity." The three-choice system
offers jurors "not guilty," "not guilty by reason of insanity," and "guilty but
mentally ill" or some other form of a "diminished responsibility" verdict.
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judgments about the culpability of a defendant. When presented
a third option of guilty but mentally ill, jurors may be tempted to
select the "middle ground" or the "easy way out" that a GBMI
verdict offers." The ABA, calling the jury's task (of judging the
defendant's culpability) in an insanity trial "essentially a moral
judgment," 2 stated that "the guilty but mentally ill verdict offers
no help in the difficult decision of assessing a defendant's crimi-
nal responsibility.""3
This difficult task that jurors face - viz., judging the culpa-
bility of the criminal defendant - is compounded by a statutory
distinction that remains troublesome even for experts in the
mental health field. Each of the thirteen GBMI jurisdictions dis-
tinguishes between "mental illness" and "insanity." Professor Fin-
kel asserts that the absence of a refined definition of "mental
illness" "bedevils the discipline of psychology as well" as layper-
sons. 4 The complex issue of assessing the defendant's culpabil-
ity or blameworthiness should not be confused by distinctions
and legislative creations that are often misleading. The addition
of the guilty but mentally ill verdict introduces a potentially dan-
gerous element into juries' processes of deliberation. Mindful of
the competing interests at issue (public safety and the individual
rights of a defendant), jurors, when asked to label a mentally ill
defendant who they believe committed an offense either "guilty,"
"mentally ill," or "legally insane," may choose the "safer" option
of GBMI. Jurors who hesitate to sentence a nonresponsible
defendant to prison, or acquit a guilty offender on the grounds
of insanity, may allay those concerns by choosing the GBMI
81. See The Insanity Defense: ABA and APA Proposals for Change, 7 MENTAL
DisAniLrry REP. 136, 144 (1983) (hereinafter ABA and APA Proposals). But see
Finkel, supra note 41, at 40-42. Finkel contradicts such claims that jurors use
the GBMI verdict as an "easy way out" of making difficult assessments of a
defendant's culpability. He notes that critics have argued against a verdict that
offers jurors a third option. These critics, according to Finkel, assert that the
GBMI verdict may lead to erroneous convictions of criminal defendants who,
because of their reduced mental capacity, ought to be exculpated. Finkel takes
issue with a 1987 study that produced a GBMI verdict in 66.7% of all
hypothetical cases that were submitted to the subjectjurors. He cites his own
1989 study in which 41% of all hypothetical cases submitted to subject-jurors
resulted in a verdict of "Diminished Responsibility." Noting that his numbers
were a "far cry" from the 66.7% figure in the 1987 study, Finkel concludes that
his study "does not immediately suggest overuse" of such diminished
responsibility verdicts. Finkel, supra note 41, at 41 (construing Caton F. Roberts
et al., Implicit Theories of Criminal Responsibility: Decision Making and the Insanity
Defense, 11 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 207 (1987)).
82. See ABA and APA Proposals, supra note 81, at 141.
83. Id.
84. See FINKEL, supra note 53, at 74.
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option which guarantees that a defendant will serve some portion
of a prison term.
By "hedging their bets" and selecting the GBMI option,
jurors may in fact be acting under a false belief that a GBMI
offender will actually receive treatment for the mental illness that
they have noted. Stripped of the "guilty but mentally ill" label,
the GBMI verdict leaves a prisoner in substantially the same situa-
tion as would a "guilty" verdict. The National Mental Health
Association recognized this problem in a 1983 study of the guilty
but mentally ill verdict. According to the NMHA, "[i]f persons
convicted under either statute ('guilty but mentally ill' and
'guilty') are treated the same in terms of disposition, we have
developed different verdicts without any distinction. This may fur-
ther mislead juries into believing that a 'guilty but mentally ill' verdict
will somehow insure treatment and at the same time protect the commu-
nity."85 Providing jurors with an instruction stating that a GBMI
verdict would not guarantee psychiatric treatment for the impris-
oned GBMI defendant merely illustrates, rather than solves, the
nature of the problem with the verdict.
Addressing these problems with GBMI, the American Bar
Association has charged that the verdict is "at best confusing and
at worst extremely prejudicial." 6 The ABA made this assertion
in light of the "strong possibility that jurors, seeing little distinc-
tion between these competing terminologies ('mentally ill' and
'insane') will choose the guilty but mentally ill verdict solely
because it appears to result in longer confinement."87 Seizing
upon the identical criticism of the GBMI verdict, Professor
Norval Morris, albeit with a sarcastic tone, characterizes the con-
fusing nature of the statutory tests for "insanity" and "guilty but
mentally ill" as follows:
"Guilty but mentally ill" supplants "not guilty by reason of
insanity." Juries must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused had the substantial capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct and to conform to the law's
demands but that he was suffering from a substantial disor-
der of thought or mood which significantly impaired his
judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability
to cope with the ordinary demands of life. Forgive the rep-
85. NATIONAL MENTAL HEALTH ASSOCIATION, MYTHS AND REALITIES: A
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 30 (1983)
(emphasis added).
86. See AMEmiCAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 68, at 393. Specifically, the
ABA referred to the typical GBMI instruction that directs when defendants
should be found "mentally ill" or "insane."
87. Id.
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etition, but these are not easy distinctions - it is like trying
to think of a very large gray animal with a trunk without
thinking of an elephant. But, as I say, juries can do it -
probably because they are informed to the consequences
of each verdict.""
As Morris suggests, the guilty but mentally ill verdict is problem-
atic because it allows jurors to evade the difficult task that is
asked of them: judging whether or not the defendant was culpa-
ble for his actions and therefore ought to be punished. The
GBMI verdict, by allowing jurors to label the defendant "mentally
ill" but failing to provide a meaningful distinction in the defend-
ant's post-trial disposition (vis-d-vis the defendant found
"guilty"), leads jurors to believe falsely that they have satisfactorily
addressed the defendant's assertion of mental illness. This possi-
bility threatens the rights of the mentally ill defendant and com-
promises the integrity of the criminal justice system.
Finally, these dangers raise questions as to whether the guilty
but mentally ill option should even be presented to jurors. The
American Psychiatric Association, in a 1982 statement, com-
mented that "a jury verdict is an awkward device for making dis-
positional decisions concerning a person's, need for mental
health treatment." 9 Decisions about a defendant's need for
mental health treatment are best reserved for those qualified in
the discipline of psychology or psychiatric care. Such decisions,
requiring diagnostic experience and clinical knowledge, should
not be entrusted to laypersons unskilled in the technical and spe-
cialized fields of mental health science. In evaluating the guilty
but mentally ill verdict, the American Bar Association classified
the GBMI option as an improper verdict.90 According to the
ABA:
[T]he GBMI verdict is deficient for another important the-
oretical reason: It is not a proper verdict at all. Rather it is
a dispositional mechanism transferred to the guilt determi-
nation phase of the criminal process .... [A ] jury determi-
nation of mental illness at the time of a charged offense is
relevant not to criminal responsibility or culpability but to
whether the accused person might receive treatment after
they have been sentenced. 91
88. MoRRs, supra note 29, at 84-85.
89. KEn-rz, supra note 75, at 45 (quoting The Insanity Defense, ABA and
APA Proposals for Change, 7 MENTAL DISABnrTy LAW REP. 144 (1983)).
90. See AMERICAN BAR ASSoCIATION, supra note 68, at 393.
91. Id. at 393-94.
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The GBMI verdict loses sight of the jury's responsibility. By
examining a defendant's state of mind at the time of the alleged
offense, jurors must determine whether the defendant possessed
the requisite culpable state of mind. This determination will ulti-
mately factor into the jurors' decision either to hold the defend-
ant criminally responsible or to acquit the defendant.92 Through
their verdict, the jurors are asked to render judgment on
whether the defendant was culpable and should be held crimi-
nally responsible for his wrongful acts. The jury's verdict ren-
dered during the guilt phase of a criminal trial should not be a
forum through which the jury offers sentencing and treatment
recommendations.
This criticism strikes at the heart of concerns about the
guilty but mentally ill verdict. Jurors are assigned the task of
assessing the moral blameworthiness of a defendant, but the
GBMI verdict hinders their progress in this undertaking. By
offering jurors a "middle ground" of no practical or operational
significance, the GBMI scheme corrupts the determination of
the defendant's culpability. As a result, the GBMI verdict imper-
missibly allows jurors to circumvent their responsibilities.
C. Circumventing the Cornerstone of Criminal Justice: The
Culpability Constraint
In evaluating the legitimacy of the GBMI verdict within the
constraints of the Anglo-American concept of culpability, one
must contemplate the various factors that serve to exculpate
criminal defendants. If severe mental illness negates the defend-
ant's culpability for his forbidden acts, it would be unjust to pun-
ish such a defendant as if he was fully culpable. Similarly, if a
defendant suffers from a lesser degree of mental illness that
reduces (but does not negate completely) his culpability, it
would be equally unjust to punish that defendant as if he was
fully culpable. Criminal defendants ought to be punished for
their forbidden acts only to the extent that they are culpable for
such actions. Stated otherwise, the degree of punishment must
be proportional to the degree of the defendant's culpability. In
order to address these inquiries, it is first necessary to understand
why society punishes wrongdoers for their forbidden acts.
92. See e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY &
BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 83 (1995). Professors
Robinson and Darley state that "liability is properly reserved for violations of
sufficient seriousness committed with sufficient culpability to justify
condemnation as criminal." Id.
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At their most basic level, issues of culpability involve ques-
tions that pervade the criminal law: why does the system punish
wrongdoers and what types of wrongdoers ought not the system
punish? The jurisprudential principles that are embedded in the
criminal law condition criminal responsibility for serious
crimes9" on whether the individual deserves moral blame for his
actions. 4 In assessing whether an actor is deserving of moral
blame for such conduct, the criminal law requires that jurors
evaluate the actor's capacity to choose and to act.95 H. L. A. Hart
noted that "[i]n all advanced legal systems liability to conviction
for serious crimes is made dependant, not only on the offender
having done these outward acts which the law forbids, but on his
having done them in a certain frame of mind or with a certain
will."96 If a criminal defendant suffers from an impaired mental
state which affects his capacity to choose and to act, then the
penal system cannot hold the wrongdoer fully liable (or fully
blameworthy) for violating the community's behavioral norms.
In the case of the GBMI verdict the jury clearly states that, in
their judgment, the defendant was mentally ill at the time he commit-
ted the offense for which he has been charged. Although this
degree of mental illness may not completely negate the defend-
ant's culpability, certainly the GBMI defendant cannot be viewed
as having the same degree of responsibility as the defendant who
was not mentally ill at the time he committed the offense.
Criminal defendants are punished not only for their wrong-
ful conduct, but also for choosing to violate the community's
behavioral norms. Jurors therefore must assess the defendant's
mental condition - his capacity to make conscious and knowing
choices97 - prior to evaluating whether or not the defendant is
fully blameworthy for his wrongful actions. ProfessorJohn Finnis
argues that society punishes wrongdoers to "restore an order of
93. Serious crimes here refer to "mala in se crimes punishable by
prolonged confinement or death." Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally
Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39
UCLA L. Rav. 1511, 1513 (1992). "Mala in se crimes refer to conduct that is
inherently wrong: behavior that breaches' community moral norms
independent of its illegality. These crimes include murder, rape, arson,
larceny, and assault." Id. at 1513 n.3.
94. Id. at 1517.
95. Id. at 1518.
96. H.LA. HART, THE MoRALrrY OF THE CRIMINAL LAw 6 (1964). Hart
illustrated this concept through an example: "if you kill a man, this is not
punishable as murder in most civilised jurisdictions if you do it unintentionally
... or while suffering from certain forms of mental abnormality." Id.
97. See Arenella, supra note 93, at 1518.
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fairness which was disrupted by the criminal's criminal act."98
When an individual chooses to act in such a manner that
infringes upon the rights of others in the community, these
actions may be construed as the result of a "choice to take advan-
tage of following one's own preferences rather than restraining
oneself to remain within that fair order."' In order to restore
"the disrupted order of fairness," society must punish the individ-
ual by denying him of his unjust gain. Continuing his argument,
Finnis next asserts that "since that advantage consisted at least
primarily in (wrongful) freedom of choice and action, the appro-
priate means of restoring the order of fairness is by depriving the
criminal of his freedom of choice and action." °° In this view of
why society punishes (as argued by Finnis), the emphasis is on
the freedom of choice and action that the wrongdoer exercised
- a wrongful exercise of choice by an individual who "really
could have chosen otherwise."0 1 If the wrongdoer's conscious
choice to act in a forbidden manner controls how and why soci-
ety punishes, then whom society ought to punish must depend on
whether or not a wrongdoer was capable of making such a
choice.
Those defendants who act contrary to the community's
behavioral norms should be punished if they are fully blamewor-
thy for their actions. Conversely, those criminal defendants who,
despite their wrongful actions, are incapable of choosing to fol-
low their own preferences should not be punished to the same
extent as those defendants who choose consciously to
subordinate society's interests to their own. According to Profes-
sor Hart, excusing conditions such as mental illness are
"required by distinct principles of Justice which restrict the
extent to which general social aims may be pursued at the cost of
98. JOHN FINNIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS 128 (1983).
99. Id.
100. Id. See alsoJOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 262-263
(1980). Finnis elaborates on this theory of why society punishes wrongdoers:
For when someone, who really could have chosen otherwise, manifests in
action a preference . . . for his own interests, his own freedom of
choice and action, as against the common interests and the legally
defined common way-of-action, then in and by the very action he gains
a certain sort of advantage over those who have restrained themselves,
restricted their pursuit of their own interests, in order to abide by the
law.
Id. (emphasis added).
101. Id.
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individuals."1" 2 This concept - the culpability constraint'
frames the issues of who ought to be punished and whether there are
limitations on whom society may punish.
The realities surrounding the guilty but mentally ill verdict,
and the lack of guaranteed treatment for those defendants who
are convicted upon a jury finding of "mentally ill," demonstrate
that punishment is the dominant effect of a GBMI verdict and
sentence. In this sense, the GBMI verdict serves retributive goals
and should not be presented to the public and to jurors as pri-
marily rehabilitative. Such attempts are disingenuous, and as
Professor Finkel notes, "[r]ehabilitation is a secondary end (of
the GBMI verdict), at best; to my way of thinking, treatment is
something that can be offered to a defendant serving time, but it
should neither be made mandatory nor the primary reason for
confining."0 4 As it stands, the GBMI verdict is an unnecessary
option. Judges currently possess the authority to order mental
health treatment for those defendants who asserted mental ill-
ness at trial but were nonetheless found "guilty." When con-
fronted with a defendant who asserts mental illness, many jurors
may struggle with the choice of sentencing a "nonresponsible"
defendant to prison or acquitting a guilty offender on the
grounds of insanity. 5 As Finkel notes, however, the search for
the "middle ground" or the desire to address the mental health
needs of the defendant should not drive the decision to confine
him.
In examining the proper role of the GBMI verdict, as well as
its proper goals, one must analyze the verdict in relation to the
constraints that are placed on the criminal justice system's ability
to punish individuals. As discussed above, the culpability con-
straint on the penal system allows society to punish defendants
only to a limited extent: the degree of punishment must be pro-
portional to the degree of the defendant's moral responsibility
for a wrongful act."' In discussing the justification for punish-
102. HART, supra note 26, at 17. Professor Hart made this observation in
the context of analyzing the relationship between criminal responsibility and
the distribution of punishment.
103. See, e.g., NicOLA LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT: POLITICAL PRINCIPLES AND
COMMUNITY VALUES 18-22 (1988); HART, supra note 26, at 1-27, 160.
104. FINKEL, supra note 53, at 273.
105. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
106. See HART, supra note 26, at 160. Describing how traditional
punishment "looks backward not forward," Professor Hart noted:
At two points, traditional punishment looks backward not forward.
One of these points corresponds to the conviction by a Court, and the
other to the Court's sentence. At both these stages the criminal's act
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ment, Hart emphasized the importance of the relationship
between punishment and criminal responsibility:
At the conviction stage, if punishment is to be justified at
all, the criminal's act must be that of a responsible agent:
that is, it must be the act of one who could have kept the
law which he has broken. And at the sentencing stage, the
punishment must bear some sort of relationship to the act:
it must in some sense "fit" or be "proportionate."
10 7
Jurisdictions that attempted to balance the competing interests
of public safety and the rights of mentally ill defendants by pass-
ing the guilty but mentally ill verdict violated this culpability con-
straint on the Anglo-American penal system. Although GBMI
defendants are acknowledged to have suffered from a mental ill-
ness at the time of the offense, the degree of punishment that
they receive is not reduced to correspond with a reduced level of
mental responsibility.
In relation to the culpability constraint on punishment, the
GBMI verdict is flawed because it punishes mentally ill defend-
ants to a greater degree than their level of culpability permits.
This criticism may be illustrated through the creation of two
scales: one which measures a defendant's culpability or blame-
worthiness, and a second which measures the degree of punish-
ment imposed on a criminal defendant. The "culpability scale"
contains two polar opposites - representing the extremes of cul-
pability. On the extreme left of the scale, we place the concepts
of legal insanity and nonresponsibility as represented in a "not
guilty by reason of insanity" verdict. At the other end of the "cul-
pability scale" - the extreme right - we place the concept of
complete mental responsibility, or blame, as represented in a
"guilty" verdict. In the middle of the "culpability scale" rests the
notion of mental illness as represented in the verdict of "guilty
but mentally ill." By placing this designation in the middle of the
scale, the GBMI scheme suggests that the guilty but mentally ill
defendant is neither fully responsible nor completely exculpated
(or excused from responsibility). Therefore, the GBMI verdict
indicates a level of culpability below that level represented in a
"guilty" verdict.
If it does not suggest a reduced level of culpability (in rela-
tion to the guilty verdict), then the GBMI verdict is no different
from a simple guilty verdict, and the designation of "guilty but
is something more than a symptom on which diagnosis and prognosis
may be based. It has an altogether different status.
Id.
107. Id.
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mentally ill" is superfluous. The claim that the GBMI verdict (if
it does not reflect a reduced degree of culpability) is no different
from a simple guilty verdict follows from our earlier examination
of the GBMI verdict and the manner in which GBMI defendants
receive (or do not receive) mental health treatment.1 08 The
GBMI verdict is not an appropriate sentencing or diagnostic tool;
decisions on whether and how to treat a defendant who has been
found guilty but mentally ill ultimately rest, in practice, with cor-
rections officials and mental health professionals. Provisions for
treating a GBMI inmate for mental illness are nearly identical to
the manner in which other defendants (those who were found
simply guilty) receive mental health treatment. Therefore, since
the GBMI verdict does not provide different treatment and sen-
tencing provisions, the GBMI label must reflect a reduced level
of responsibility. If it does not, the GBMI verdict serves no pur-
pose - becoming instead a vestigial organ on the penal system's
body that should be amputated.
The second consideration in the relationship between
responsibility and punishment involves the "punishment scale."
The "punishment scale" also contains two extremes. On the
extreme left end of the scale the criminal defendant, because of
his nonresponsibility, is not punished. Although the defendant
later may be committed to a mental health institution for treat-
ment, the defendant is not punished (in the traditional sense)
through incarceration in the correctional system.' 0 9 On the
opposite end of the "punishment scale" (the extreme right), we
place the manner in which the penal system currently punishes
'fully blameworthy' defendants - those found GBMI and guilty.
The defendants in this category of punishment face lengthy
incarceration or the death penalty. The deficiency in the GBMI
verdict is illustrated once the two scales are viewed together. The
GBMI defendant, although he falls somewhere in the middle of
the "culpability scale," is punished in accordance with the
extreme right of the "punishment scale." Although the GBMI
108. See discussion supra part II.
109. In analyzing the concept of punishment, H. L. A. Hart outlined
several factors that are necessary for punishment:[1] Punishment must involve pain or other consequences normally
considered unpleasant.
[2] It must be for an offense against legal rules.
[3] It must be of an actual or supposed offender for his offense.
[4] It must be intentionally administered by human beings other than
the Offender.
[5] It must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted
by a legal system against which the offense is committed.
HART, supra note 26, at 4-5.
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defendant's culpability must be reduced by his mental illness
(thus moving him more toward the extreme left - nonresponsi-
bility - of the "culpability scale"), his level of punishment is not
reduced in corresponding fashion. This failure of the GBMI stat-
ute is best illustrated by the GBMI defendant's continuing eligi-
bility for the death penalty."' By punishing the GBMI
defendant as if he was guilty,"' the penal system ignores the
defendant's reduced level of culpability. In so doing, the GBMI
jurisdictions violate the culpability constraint of Anglo-American
criminal law by not reducing the level of punishment to corre-
spond with the defendant's reduced degree of criminal
responsibility.
D. GBMI and the Mental Health Power/Criminal Law Power
Dichotomy
The flaw in the GBMI verdict, from a "culpability perspec-
tive," exists in the "hybrid nature"l"' of the verdict. The GBMI
verdict appears to synthesize both rehabilitative goals and retrib-
utive goals. Professor Norval Morris, however, cautions that such
hybrids are dangerous due to the different factors which define
and limit the distinct goals found in the verdict: retribution and
rehabilitation." 3 In drawing a distinction between the "criminal
law power" and the "mental health power" of the state, 1 4 Profes-
sor Morris notes that each has a different limiting principle and a
different objective purpose.11 5 When the two powers are con-
fused (as they are in the GBMI verdict), Morris claims that the
different limiting principles cannot be reconciled and that
"injustice and inefficiency result."' 16 This is unquestionably the
case in the GBMI jurisdictions. The question of the defendant's
mental condition at the time of the offense should be reserved
110. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 413 S.E.2d 19 (S.C. 1992); Van W. Ellis,
Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict and the Death Penalty: Punishment Full of Sound and
Fury, Signifying Nothing, 43 DuKE L. J. 87 (1993).
111. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-70 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
112. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 68, § 7-6.10, at 394.
113. See Moius, supra note 29, at 30.
114. Id. Morris identifies these as the only two powers by which society
may deprive and individual of his or her liberty. These two powers have
different prerequisites that must be met for them to be invoked:
To imprison - that he has been convicted of a crime and that his
imprisonment is both deserved and socially desirable; and To commit
to a mental hospital - that he is mentally ill or retarded and that he is
a danger to others or to himself or is incapable of caring for himself.
Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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solely for evaluating the degree of criminal responsibility to
which the defendant should be held. This issue should not be
addressed by ajury for the purpose of choosing treatment or sen-
tencing options.
The injustice arising from the GBMI verdict may be attrib-
uted to the consolidation of the mental health and criminal law
powers of the state. The intended end of the GBMI verdict,
whether it invokes the criminal law power or the mental health
power, is not readily discernible at first glance. The confusion
may be traced to the conflict between the limiting factor, as Mor-
ris describes them, of each power. The criminal law power (lim-
ited by the "concept of the maximum deserved punishment for
what the offender did") 117 and the mental health power (limited by
the "concept of mental health treatment that is needed to rem-
edy the illness and to alleviate any dangers") 118 are controlled by
separate principles, and any attempt to combine the two powers
creates conflict between the limiting principle of each. This ten-
sion yields a verdict which, in practice, applies an incomplete ver-
sion of each power. In its outward appearance, the GBMI verdict
focuses on both of these powers; the verdict therefore lacks clear
guidance and direction as to which factors should govern its
implementation.
In relation to the culpability constraint - viz., we may pun-
ish an individual only to the extent that he or she is responsible
for his or her wrongful actions - the GBMI verdict raises serious
concerns. In analyzing the GBMI option, Professor Morris asks:
Can it survive the challenge of analytic principle? I think
not. It seems to me on its face and in its operation a means
of drawing [i.e., pulling or removing] such acquitting and
destigmatizing teeth as were left in the special defense of
insanity... while pretending to preserve the moral values
embedded in the ideas underlying that special defense.
No one is deceived, certainly not the prisoner.11 9
This concern cannot be dismissed blithely as insignificant in light
of the reality that many GBMI prisoners will never receive psy-
chological or psychiatric treatment for their mental illnesses. In
effect, although the jury found that the defendant was mentally
ill at the time of the offense, the GBMI prisoner is punished retribu-
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 85-86. Professor Morris isolates the approach that must be
taken when examining issues of "principle underlying the responsibility of the
mentally ill." Id. at 54. Morris states, "[t]he issues are basically legal, moral, and
political, not medical or psychological." Id.
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tively, in a manner nearly identical to how the system punishes a
defendant who has been found "guilty" (without a finding of
mental illness). Such a result is highly inconsistent with society's
standards of criminal justice, and with the standards by which the
penal system deals with mentally ill defendants.
Under most GBMI statutes, a prisoner who is treated for
mental illness must be returned to the department of corrections
to complete the balance of his sentence once the treatment is
completed.12 ° This approach punishes the GBMI prisoner, once
"cured," on the basis of a "relation back" theory of culpability.
Although the GBMI defendant was found (by a jury verdict of
GBMI) to have been mentally ill at the time of the offense, the pris-
oner who is returned to the general prison population subse-
quently will be punished for the very offense he committed while
mentally ill Once the GBMI offender's treatment is completed,
his "now cured" mental state serves as the basis for punishing
him as ifhe had been found guilty - or as if he had not suffered
from mental illness at the time of the crime. The GBMI verdict
therefore violates the culpability constraint on our criminal jus-
tice system. The jury's determination that the defendant was
mentally ill at the time of the offense, a judgment relating to the
defendant's culpability, does not mitigate (in the case of the
GBMI jurisdiction) the extent to which the defendant will be
punished. In fact, unless we disregard the jury's determination
that the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the offense, the
defendant is punished to a greater extent than his culpability.
Commenting on this facet of the GBMI verdict, the ABA stated
that, "[i]f in fact the defendant is so mentally diseased or defec-
tive as to be not criminally responsible for the offending act, it
would be morally obtuse to assign criminal liability. The
factfinder's answer should not be 'yes, but ..... "21 By allowing
punishment that exceeds the defendant's criminal responsibility,
the GBMI verdict is indeed "moral sleight-of-hand." 2
In this instance, the confusion over the intended goals of
GBMI presents difficulties in terms of how our community views
questions of culpability. The basic issue is one of moral princi-
ple: can the Anglo-American system of justice tolerate a verdict
120. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-70(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
The South Carolina statute, for example, provides that if a GBMI prisoner
receives treatment for a mental illness, he must be returned to prison if "in the
opinion of the staff at the facility the defendant may safely be moved to the
general population of the Department of Corrections to serve the remainder of
his sentence." Id.
121. ABA and APA Proposals, supra note 81, at 141.
122. Id.
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that punishes defendants who were mentally ill (at the time they
committed a crime) the same as it punishes defendants who were
not suffering from mental illness? This notion of justice is
grounded in a system which attempts to guarantee that punish-
ment is imposed in a consistent manner. Part of this consistency
requires that individuals may be punished only to the extent that
they are culpable for their wrongful acts. When this constraint
upon our system is violated, the system sacrifices its moral integ-
rity. By accepting the guilty but mentally ill verdict in thirteen
states, the criminal justice system has yielded to political expedi-
ency rather than holding to moral principle.
IV. RIGHT TO MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT AND THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT
A. Discretionary Versus Mandatory Mental Health Treatment
Section III of this Article discussed the practical difficulties
which the guilty but mentally ill verdict creates, via the jury sys-
tem and in relation to the culpability constraint, for our criminal
justice system. In addition to those practical and jurisprudential
issues, the guilty but mentally ill verdict must also face constitu-
tional arguments. Although Due Process arguments raise legiti-
mate constitutional questions about the viability of the GBMI
verdict,"' 3 this section of the Article explores Eighth Amendment
questions related to a mentally ill offender's right to mental
health treatment. If the GBMI verdict is to be retained as a
meaningful and permissible 24 jury option,'25 states must address
the absence of guaranteed mental health treatment. A funda-
mental problem with the guilty but mentally ill option is the fail-
ure of states to assure that all GBMI offenders will receive
psychological or psychiatric treatment. The structure and word-
ing of the various treatment provisions of GBMI statutes12 6 allow
for too much discretion on the part of correctional department
123. See, e.g., Note, The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict and Due Process, 92
YALE L.J. 475 (1983).
124. "Permissible" here refers to the manner in which the GBMI verdict
comports or fails to comport with the culpability constraint on our system of
criminal punishment. This verdict's viability also includes assurances that the
jury examine the defendant's mental state (at the time of the commission of the
alleged offense) for purposes of judging only the defendant's culpability (as it
applies to whether the defendant may be held criminally responsible for his
wrongful acts), rather than concerns about incarceration and treatment
(dispositional concerns).
125. For a plan in which I propose altering the GBMI verdict and system,
see infra section V.
126. See supra part II.C.
19961
378 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 10
officials. Eighth Amendment concerns address the degree of sig-
nificance, if any, that will be attached to ajury's determination of
mental illness.
In a 1988 decision from the Supreme Court of South
Dakota, Robinson v. Solem, 127 the court noted that "[i] n finding a
defendant mentally ill under South Dakota's GBMI statute, judge
or jury does not find that treatment is needed, but only that the
offender has a psychiatric disorder of thought, mood, or behav-
ior which impairs his or herjudgment."12s Writing for the court,
Judge Steele then stated that "[t] here is no constitutional right to
treatment merely because of that finding." 129 In light of this
finding, the court next reasoned that the "essential test" for
whether an offender will receive either psychiatric or psychologi-
cal treatment "is one of medical necessity and not simply treat-
ment which may be considered as merely desirable."13 ° In
casting aside the significance of the jury's findings on the issue of
mental illness, the court illustrated the nature of the problem
with GBMI verdicts - that the jury's opinion neither reduces the
defendant's level of culpability nor provides him mental health
treatment. The purpose of the GBMI verdict, to provide juries
with an additional option for those offenders whom they judge to
have been suffering from mental illness at the time they commit-
ted the offense (although more responsible than NGRI defend-
ants), has been thwarted. In the absence of a guarantee that
these GBMI offenders will be treated for mental illness, the
GBMI defendant will in essence be treated no differently from an
offender who is found simply "guilty." 1 '
In his dissent from the court's opinion in Robinson, Justice
Henderson opined that South Dakota's GBMI statute was uncon-
stitutional because it failed to guarantee that GBMI defendants
would receive psychological or psychiatric treatment. According
to Justice Henderson, South Dakota's GBMI statute was flawed
because a defendant "may be treated later, but this is left entirely
to the discretion of the board of charities and corrections. Even
127. 432 N.W.2d 246 (S.D. 1988).
128. Id. at 249.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Moimus, supra note 29, at 85. Professor Morris reiterates the
apparent futility of the GBMI verdict in such cases: "Since in Michigan any
mentally ill prisoner may, with appropriate consent, be transferred to a mental
health hospital, the distinctions between 'guilty' and 'guilty but mentally ill' are
not of translucent clarity." Id. Professor Morris then explains that the
distinction becomes meaningless since "[b] oth groups may be given psychiatric
treatment in both types of institutions and for the same maximum periods.
The punishment ... may be the same." Id.
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if treatment is determined to be necessary and available, the pris-
oner can be allowed to sit and rot without treatment ... .13
Although some jurisdictions ("Type I" jurisdictions) have GBMI
statutes that operate more efficiently than others (by requiring
that some treatment must be given), many statutes entrust the cor-
rections facilities with far too much discretion in this decision.1 3 3
Although one may view this statutory structure as drawing a
distinction between medical judgments (related to treatment
considerations) and legal judgments (relating to jurors assess-
ment of the defendant's culpability), the practical result points
to the failure of the verdict. If the jury's judgment of mental
illness were reserved solely for the issue of the defendant's culpa-
bility, the level of punishment imposed on a GBMI offender
would be lesser than the level of punishment imposed on the
offender who was found guilty (without an indication of mental
illness). In practice, a state official may find that a GBMI defend-
ant is not mentally ill and does not need treatment; this determi-
nation is made despite the fact that the jury found that the
defendant was mentally ill. As a matter of principle, and as a
matter of public policy, states should not provide jurors with a
GBMI option that essentially renders meaningless a significant
component of their verdict and decision.
B. A Right to Treatment? The Failure to Treat and Eighth
Amendment Arguments
Two factors: the vast discretion given to prison and correc-
tions officials under GBMI statutes, and the words of Judge
Steele in Robinson that "[t]here is no constitutional right to treat-
ment merely because of [the jury finding of mental illness],""'
require that we examine whether GBMI prisoners have a consti-
tutional right to mental health treatment. In 1976, the Supreme
Court of the United States, through Justice Thurgood Marshall's
opinion in Estelle v. Gamble,' 5 proffered its analysis for Eighth
Amendment standards of cruel and unusual punishment.
132. Robinson, 432 N.W.2d. at 253 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
133. The South Dakota statute, for example, does not mandate that
treatment must be given even when it is deemed necessary by the appropriate
officials. The statute states, "he shall undergo further examination and may be
given the treatment that is psychiatrically indicated for his mental illness." S.D.
CODIFMD LAws ANN. § 23A-27-38 (Supp. 1995) (emphasis added). Michigan,
another Type IIjurisdiction, mandates that a GBMI prisoner "sham... be given
such treatment as is psychiatrically indicated .... " MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 768.36(3) (1982) (emphasis added).
134. Robinson, 432 N.W.2d. at 249.
135. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
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According to the Court, the "deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wan-
ton infliction of pain' proscribed by the Eighth Amendment" to
the United States Constitution. l"6 In outlining the Eighth
Amendment standards for medical care in prisons, the United
States District Court for the District of Arizona, in Casey v.
Lewis," 7 held that "'these requirements [Eighth Amendment
arguments on prisoners' right to treatment] apply to physical,
dental and mental health.' ""' The District Court in Casey
applied the Supreme Court's current Eighth Amendment analy-
sis - articulating the standards from Estelle - in ruling that a
prison's inadequate mental health treatment system violated the
Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.13 9
In light of modem Eighth Amendment analysis, it would
appear thatJudge Steele's assertion that there is no right to treat-
ment based on a jury's finding of mental illness was perhaps pre-
mature. The focal point of Eighth Amendment analysis, in terms
of the constitutionality of the GBMI verdict, is the exploration of
whether the state's failure to provide psychiatric or psychological
treatment to GBMI defendants may be classified as "deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs" of the prisoners. The
question is particularly important to the analysis of the statutory
schemata established in Type II GBMI jurisdictions. The struc-
ture of Type II statutes, such as Georgia's or South Dakota's, pro-
vides for deference to the discretion of corrections officials.
These statutes place the ultimate judgment on the decision of
whether or not to treat GBMI offenders with corrections officials
even in those cases where a mental health assessment has indicated
that the GBMI prisoner requires care. Such a statutory frame-
work presents problems for the GBMI verdict. Under the
Supreme Court's analysis in Estelle, as extrapolated by courts to
include mental health needs, GBMI prisoners may indeed claim
a right to mental health treatment - an Eighth Amendment
claim that the denial of needed mental health treatment violates
constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual
punishment.
136. Id. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
137. 834 F. Supp. 1477 (D. Ariz. 1993).
138. Id. at 1544 (quoting Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir.
1982)). The court in Casey also stated that "[o]fficials can be held liable for
their failure to implement a proper mental health care program or failure to
adequately train or supervise subordinates." Casey, 834 F. Supp. at 1544.
139. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
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The Arizona District Court, in its 1993 Casey decision, ruled
that mentally ill prisoners properly stated a section 1983 civil
rights action14 when they alleged that prison officials violated
their constitutional rights by denying them adequate mental
health treatment."' The basis for the court's decision was its
belief that denying mental health treatment to mentally illprisoners
was a violation of their Eighth Amendment Constitutional rights.
The court determined that these prisoners experienced "unac-
ceptable" delays in both the assessment and treatment of their
serious mental health needs. 142 The court further noted that
prisoners who were "locked down" as a result of behavioral
problems that had remained either unassessed or untreated were
"provided improper mental health care or no mental health
care."14 The court ruled that such conduct by prison officials
(in failing to treat properly the mental illnesses of prison
inmates) "clearly rises to the level of deliberate indifference to the
serious mental health needs of the inmates and violates their
constitutional rights to be free from cruel and unusualpunishment. "1"
Although Eighth Amendment analysis in most GBMI cases
will not focus on the treatment of prisoners who are "locked
down" for behavioral problems, the central issue in these cases,
as with Casey, remains the denial of mental health treatment to
prisoners who require such care. In Type IIjurisdictions such as
South Dakota and Georgia, where treatment is discretionary
despite findings from both a jury and a mental health examina-
tion (findings which indicate that the prisoner suffers from some
mental illness), the conduct of the prison officials may rise to the
level of "substantial indifference" to the prisoner's mental health
needs. According to the Supreme Court in Estelle, the underlying
test is whether or not the failure to treat mentally ill prisoners is
consistent with " 'broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civi-
140. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
141. In order to state a valid claim under § 1983, an individual must
"allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the
United States." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). In order to state a claim
grounded in a violation of the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, "a prisoner must establish 'acts or omissions sufficiently harmful
to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.' " Casey v. Lewis,
834 F. Supp. 1477, 1543 (D. Ariz. 1993) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1976)). The Casey court also noted that this "indifference must be
substantial to violate the constitution." 834 F. Supp. at 1543.
142. Casey, 834 F. Supp. at 1548.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1549 (emphasis added).
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lized standards, humanity, and decency.' "145 In his Estelle opin-
ion, Justice Marshall also stated that "[t]hese elementary
principles establish the government's obligation to provide medi-
cal care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration."'16 Jus-
tice Marshall noted that unnecessary suffering is inconsistent
with "contemporary standards of decency as manifested in mod-
em legislation." 14 7 According to Justice Marshall, this standard
codifies the view that justice requires society to care for prisoners
who, by reason of deprivation of their liberty, cannot adequately
care for themselves. 48
Applying this inquiry on both a constitutional and a public
policy level, the guilty but mentally ill verdict, specifically the
GBMI version in some Type II jurisdictions, fails the analysis that
the Supreme Court articulated in Estelle. Dissenting from the
South Dakota Supreme Court's opinion in Robinson v. Solem, Jus-
tice Henderson posed the pivotal question. Henderson asked
"[h]ow well does (the South Dakota GBMI statute) compare to
the 'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society?' "' His answer: "[i]t fails miserably, repre-
senting no less than a throwback to the days when insane asylums
were storage pens and little more." 5 ° That most state GBMI stat-
utes fail to guarantee that prisoners found "guilty but mentally
ill" will be treated creates, at a minimum, the possibility that pris-
ons will become nothing more than storage facilities for inmates
with serious mental illnesses. Such a prospect, a realistic one,15" '
does not comport with society's standards of decency. On the
contrary, the possibility chills one's sense of decency and justice.
V. CONCLUSIONS - A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
The guilty but mentally ill verdict came into being in a cli-
mate of fear and confusion. Fearful solutions do not, however,
produce sound public policy on issues that implicate questions of
moral principle. The competing goals of the insanity defense
reform movement - public safety and the rights of mentally ill
145. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102 (quotingJackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579
(8th Cir. 1968)).
146. Este//e, 429 U.S. at 103.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 103-04.
149. Robinson v. Solem, 432 N.W.2d 246, 254 (S.D. 1988) (Henderson,J.
dissenting) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)).
150. Id.
151. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of
assurances that mentally ill inmates will receive psychological or psychiatric
treatment that is necessary or indicated).
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defendants - were not given equal weight in the legislative pro-
cess. Nearly fourteen years after the dust from' Hinckley has set-
tled, the GBMI option must be carefully evaluated, in an
atmosphere removed from the fears and pressures that character-
ized the movement in the early 1980's.
The GBMI verdict, as an additional option for jurors, under-
mines the integrity of our criminal justice system and its stan-
dards. Enacted for the stated purpose of reducing the number
of erroneous NGRI acquittals and providing mental health treat-
ment to mentally ill defendants, -the verdict has accomplished
neither of these goals. The number of NGRI acquittals remains
unchanged or increases in systems that have added the GBMI
option. Furthermore, the GBMI verdict does not guarantee that
mentally ill GBMI offenders will receive mental health treatment.
As Part III of this Article demonstrated, the stark reality of the
GBMI verdict is that GBMI prisoners rarely receive psychiatric or
psychological treatment. As a result, GBMI prisoners are often
punished in a manner identical to those prisoners who were
found "guilty."
Aside from failing to achieve its stated goals, the GBMI ver-
dict also presents a dilemma in terms of culpability principles.
The GBMI verdict offers jurors a "middle ground" and entices
them to evade their responsibility of judging the defendant's
blameworthiness. This task, albeit a difficult one, safeguards the
integrity of our criminal justice system. The American Psychiat-
ric Association described the role of jurors in deciding cases as
"vital to set.., societal ideas about responsibility and nonrespon-
sibility."152 Noting that the GBMI option allows jurors to avoid
deciding this issue, the APA stated that "[a] n important symbolic
function of the criminal law is lost through the 'guilty but men-
tally ill' approach."15
In order to restore and safeguard the integrity of our crimi-
nal justice system, the guilty but mentally ill verdict should be
eliminated as a jury option. Presently, the GBMI verdict fails to
abide by the culpability constraint on the criminal law and penal
statutes: the degree of punishment that criminal defendants
receive must be proportional to their level of culpability.
Although the GBMI defendant is labelled "mentally ill" (sug-
gesting a lesser degree of mental responsibility) the GBMI
inmate receives the same degree of punishment as a defendant
found guilty (without any mental illness or impairment) of the
same offense. The GBMI option should therefore be eliminated.
152. ABA and APA Proposals, supra note 81, at 144.
153. Id.
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This prospect, however, does not appear realistic due to the
political pressures which led to the verdict's enactment in the
early 1980's. NGRI acquittees may no longer be held in mental
health institutions while the public is assured that they will never
be released back into society. As a result, public pressure
remains for legislators to safeguard the rights of the community
- first by reducing the number of criminal defendants who
assert the insanity defense, and second, by ensuring that those
mentally ill defendants will be removed from society at-large. A
more realistic approach to the problem, therefore, is to reform
the GBMI verdict. Meaningful reform of the GBMI verdict must
restore to the jury the role of evaluating the defendant's mental
illness for the purpose of assessing his criminal responsibility. These
changes must be made in order that the verdict will conform
with the underlying moral concerns for the justice of jury
verdicts.
First, the guilty but mentally ill verdict must attach some sig-
nificance to the jury's determination that the defendant was men-
tally ill at the time he committed the offense. Although the jury's
finding cannot dictate a mental health expert's diagnosis or
treatment of the GBMI offender, the jury's verdict - specifically
its finding that the defendant was mentally ill - must hold some
efficacy at the guilt phase of the trial. Implicit in the jury's opin-
ion that the defendant was mentally ill at the time he committed the
offense is a determination that he was not completely blamewor-
thy for his wrongful actions - that he was less culpable than a
"normal" defendant who was found simply "guilty." If this assertion is
not true, then the GBMI verdict is superfluous; the option of
GBMI creates a meaningless distinction that should not be
retained. Therefore, a verdict of "guilty but mentally ill" should
mitigate the sentence which the defendant receives. By mitigat-
ing the GBMI offender's punishment, the verdict would address
the defendant's mental illness in a meaningful way at the guilt
phase of the trial In doing so (mitigating the GBMI offender's
punishment or sentence - even if the GBMI defendant no
longer suffers from mental illness), the GBMI jurisdictions will
adhere to the culpability constraint on the Anglo-American sys-
tem of punishment. The degree of punishment, once reduced
from the statutory sentence that is imposed on guilty offenders,
would then be proportional to the GBMI defendant's reduced
level of culpability as indicated by his mental illness.
Second, to remove the risk of misleading jurors, the GBMI
verdict must guarantee that the state will provide mental health
treatment to defendants who are mentally ill at the time they are
sentenced. This determination cannot be made, however, based
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simply on the jury's finding of mental illness. Although the jury
found evidence of mental illness, this indicates only that the
defendant suffered from mental illness at the time of the offense.
Such a determination is not dispositive of whether the defendant
should receive mental health treatment at the time he is sentenced.
In addition, ethical considerations preclude a mental health pro-
fessional from evaluating and treating patients based solely on
the opinion of a layperson. Therefore, the guilty but mentally ill
verdict should mandate that the GBMI offender receive a mental
health evaluation prior to sentencing. If the defendant suffers
from mental illness at this time (as determined by the mental
health evaluation), the statute must guarantee that the prisoner
will receive proper mental health treatment. Once treated, if the
defendant no longer requires further mental health attention, he
should then be returned to the general prison population to
complete the balance of his mitigated sentence.
These provisions, especially mitigating the GBMI offender's
sentence, would tailor the retributive aspect of the GBMI verdict
so it conforms with the culpability constraint on punishment.
The GBMI statute (as reformed) would guarantee that GBMI
offenders receive treatment if, at the sentencing phase, they are
deemed to suffer from mental illness. The verdict would simulta-
neously limit the extent to which GBMI offenders are punished if
they no longer suffer from mental illness. The end result, there-
fore, would produce a GBMI statute that adheres to the culpabil-
ity constraint on punishment - a statute that punishes offenders
only to the extent that they were culpable at the time they com-
mitted the wrongful act. The proposed statute would strike a
proper balance between the competing concerns of public safety
and the rights of individual defendants. Although the GBMI stat-
ute does not reduce the number of defendants who are found
not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI), this proposed statute
would weigh more carefully the rights of mentally ill defendants.
This measure would preserve the integrity of the criminal justice
system and address the needs of mentally ill defendants in a spirit
of moral fidelity.
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APPENDIX
If the GBMI option must be retained, states should modify
the statutory language in order to conform with the concerns
raised in this Article. The following is a proposed legislative
option which addresses these issues - specifically by reducing
the degree of punishment to correspond with a reduced level of
culpability.
Proposed Model Statute
If a verdict of Guilty But Mentally Ill (as authorized by the
previous section) is returned against a defendant in a criminal
case, the following shall occur prior to sentencing:
(A) The defendant shall undergo a mental health evalua-
tion to be administered by a qualified, court-appointed
mental health care expert. The purpose of the examination
shall be to determine whether the defendant continues to
suffer from a mental illness as defined in the previous
section.
(B) If the court-ordered mental health evaluation indicates.
that the defendant continues to suffer from a mental illness
as defined in the previous section, then the defendant must
be placed in a mental health care facility for the purpose of
treating the mental illness. The defendant shall remain in
such mental health care facility either
(1) for the duration of his sentence; or
(2) until the mental health care professionals at such
facility determine that the defendant no longer suffers
from the mental illness that was diagnosed under sub-
section (A) of this section.
(C) A defendant who under subsection (B) has been placed
in a mental health care facility may be released from such
facility subject to the following conditions:
(1) A defendant who under section (B) (2) of this sec-
tion no longer suffers from a mental illness shall be
transferred to the Department of Corrections. The
defendant must serve the balance of his prison term as
sentenced under subsection (D) of this section.
(2) A defendant who under subsection (B) (1) of this
section has remained in a mental health care facility for
the duration of his prison term as sentenced under sub-
section (D) of this section shall be discharged from the
facility unless a mental health evaluation determines
that the defendant is eligible for civil commitment
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because he suffers from a mental illness and poses a
danger either to himself or society.
(D) If a defendant has been found Guilty But Mentally Ill
under the previous section, and pursuant to a mental health
evaluation under subsection (A) of this section, does not suf-
fer from a mental illness, then the court shall sentence the
defendant as follows:
(1) The Guilty But Mentally Ill defendant shall be sen-
tenced as if he had been found guilty, except that,
(a) the length of the prison term shall be reduced
and correspond to the defendant's reduced level of
responsibility caused by his mental illness at the
time of the offense; and
(b) at no time shall the Guilty But Mentally Ill
defendant receive the statutory maximum allowed
for his criminal offense.

